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THE ELUSIVE ZONE OF TWILIGHT 
MICHAEL COENEN* 
SCOTT M. SULLIVAN** 
Abstract: In his canonical concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, Justice Robert Jackson set forth a “tripartite” framework for evaluating exercises of 
presidential power. Regarding the middle category of that framework, Justice Jackson 
famously suggested that presidential actions undertaken “in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority” implicate “a zone of twilight,” within which “any ac-
tual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary 
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.” Since the articulation of this idea 
some seventy years ago, the Supreme Court has furnished little additional guidance as 
to how courts should evaluate presidential actions that implicate the “zone of twilight,” 
thus leaving it largely to the lower courts to translate Justice Jackson’s “contemporary 
imponderables” into workable doctrinal commands. Taking that observation as its start-
ing point, this Article canvasses the small but important body of lower court opinions 
that have grappled with Justice Jackson’s zone of twilight. Its investigation yields two 
important takeaways. First, these opinions reveal a varied, ad hoc, and sometimes-
inconsistent set of approaches to reviewing twilight-zone actions, as lower courts have 
failed to converge on a single methodological approach to evaluating presidential action 
against a backdrop of formal legislative silence. And second, the opinions reflect a 
longstanding and steadfast reluctance to engage with the twilight zone’s substance, as 
lower courts have frequently found ways to avoid concluding that plausible instances of 
twilight-zone action give rise to the “contemporary imponderables” that Justice Jackson 
himself invoked. We hypothesize that these two features of contemporary twilight-zone 
opinions—their doctrinal haphazardness and their sporadic incidence—may exist in 
something of a positive feedback loop, with the uncertain and amorphous state of “twi-
light-zone doctrine” deterring lower courts from assigning presidential action to Justice 
Jackson’s middle category, and with the relative paucity of twilight-zone opinions im-
peding the development of a coherent and streamlined decisional methodology. We thus 
conclude this Article by proposing a simple but flexible method of two-dimensional twi-
light-zone analysis—an approach that might help to break this cycle of avoidance and 
amorphousness and thus render Justice Jackson’s zone of twilight a more useful and ac-
tive venue for the resolution of separation-of-powers cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer has given rise to one of the most well-known tests for adjudicat-
ing separation-of-powers disputes in U.S. constitutional law.1 The test employs 
a “tripartite” framework for evaluating the constitutionality of challenged ex-
ecutive actions, with each challenged action falling into one of three distinct 
categories depending on the statutory backdrop against which it proceeds.2 
Specifically, where the President acts “pursuant to an express or implied au-
thorization of Congress,” the action is “supported by the strongest of presump-
tions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of per-
suasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.”3 Conversely, where 
the President’s actions are “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress,” the President’s power reaches “its lowest ebb” and “must be scruti-
nized with caution.”4 And, between those two extremes, where “the President 
acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority,”5 there 
exists a middle “zone of twilight,” within which “any actual test of power is 
likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables 
rather than on abstract theories of law.”6 
As this summary presentation makes clear, Justice Jackson’s concurrence 
sets forth relatively straightforward doctrinal prescriptions for actions that fall 
within Category One (authorized by Congress) and Category Three (disap-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 2 Id. at 635; see also Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (2015) (“In 
considering claims of Presidential power this Court refers to Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite 
framework from Youngstown . . . .” (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38)). 
 3 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37. 
 4 Id. at 637–38. 
 5 Id. at 637. A small terminological point: it is somewhat unclear whether Justice Jackson under-
stood the “zone of twilight” to encompass the entire category of Youngstown-type cases involving 
congressional silence, or the overlapping (but not coextensive) category of cases involving the concur-
rent powers of the legislative and executive branch. See id. (“When the President acts in absence of 
either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, 
but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain.”). Notwithstanding this ambiguity, we are here using the phrase to encom-
pass the former category of cases—i.e., all of those cases in which the President is deemed to have 
acted “in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority.” See id. This is in accordance 
with the understanding that subsequent courts and commentators have embraced. See, e.g., Zivotofsky, 
135 S. Ct. at 2084 (noting that “‘in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority’ 
there is a ‘zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority’” (emphasis add-
ed) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637)); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical 
Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 419 (2012) (“Under [Jackson’s] frame-
work, the President’s power is at its zenith when supported by express or implied congressional au-
thorization, at its nadir when expressly or implicitly opposed by Congress, and in an intermediate 
‘zone of twilight’ when Congress has neither supported nor opposed presidential action.”). 
 6 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637. 
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proved of by Congress) of its tripartite framework.7 But the same cannot be 
said of Category Two (congressional silence), whose operative prescriptions 
are famously open-ended and vague.8 What is more, whereas the Supreme 
Court and its Justices have occasionally identified challenged executive actions 
as falling within Categories One and Three (and subsequently evaluated such 
actions in accordance with each category’s respective principles),9 the Court 
has offered only limited and indirect elaboration on the nature of Category-
Two analysis in separation-of-powers cases.10 Neither Justice Jackson’s con-
currence itself nor subsequent Supreme Court applications of the Youngstown 
framework have thus provided much guidance as to how courts should decide 
Category-Two cases.11 
All of this is well known and well understood. What is less well known 
and well understood is the manner in which lower courts have gone about nav-
igating the “zone of twilight” when applying the Jackson framework for them-
selves. The Supreme Court, after all, is not the only judicial institution that 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See id. at 635–38. 
 8 See, e.g., Daniel Abebe & Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist Approach, 66 
VAND. L. REV. 723, 733 (2013) (noting that Justice Jackson’s guidance regarding the resolution of 
twilight-zone cases “is simultaneously inspiring and useless”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling In-
herent Presidential Power: Providing a Framework for Judicial Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 870 
(1983) (contending that “Justice Jackson’s analysis is of no help in deciding cases” within the zone of 
twilight because it “provides almost no guidance as to how these cases should be decided”). 
 9 See, e.g., Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084 (“Because the President’s refusal to implement § 214(d) 
falls into Justice Jackson’s third category, his claim must be ‘scrutinized with caution,’ and he may 
rely solely on powers the Constitution grants to him alone.” (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638)); 
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 527 (2008) (concluding that “[the President’s] assertion of authority, 
insofar as it is based on the pertinent non-self-executing treaties, is . . . within Justice Jackson’s third 
category, not the first or even the second”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 639 (2006) (Kenne-
dy, J., concurring in part) (“While these laws provide authority for certain forms of military courts, 
they also impose limitations, at least two of which control this case. If the President has exceeded 
these limits, this becomes a case of conflict between Presidential and congressional action—a case 
within Justice Jackson’s third category, not the second or first.”); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000) (noting that the “express investiture of the President with statutory 
authority to act for the United States in imposing sanctions with respect to the Government of Burma 
. . . recalls Justice Jackson’s observation that . . . ‘[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or 
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses 
in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate’” (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635)); Dames 
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673–74 (holding that a presidential order calling for the nullifica-
tion of judicial attachment orders involving Iranian assets “was taken pursuant to specific congres-
sional authorization” and thus fell within the first category of Justice Jackson’s framework). 
 10 See infra Part I.B. 
 11 As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals observed in 2006, “What Justice Jackson proclaimed 
in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company fifty-four years ago—that the judiciary 
‘may be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete 
problems of executive power as they actually present themselves’—resonates with us today.” Ex parte 
Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (footnote omitted) (quoting Youngstown, 343 
U.S. at 634), aff’d sub nom. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
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confronts cases about presidential power. The Court’s own separation-of-
powers decisions typically arrive by way of the federal courts of appeals.12 
And, more importantly, the district and circuit courts are regularly confronted 
with separation-of-powers cases that the Court either declines or is unable to 
decide. Over the nearly seventy years that have elapsed since Youngstown, 
lower courts have published the vast majority of opinions applying and engag-
ing with the framework that Justice Jackson’s concurrence sets forth.13 Thus, 
any effort to understand the real-world significance of Justice Jackson’s “zone 
of twilight” would do well to bring those lower court decisions into the fold. 
That is what this Article attempts to do. Its analysis is based on a compre-
hensive survey of the federal courts’ engagement with Justice Jackson’s 
framework in separation-of-powers cases. Specifically, it focuses on the differ-
ent ways in which those courts have attempted to impose order within this no-
toriously loose and unstructured doctrinal domain. 
Two challenges in particular have been at the center of our attention: 
First, and most obviously, is the challenge of evaluating presidential action in 
the face of congressional silence, or what we call the challenge of twilight-zone 
engagement. When faced with presidential action about which the relevant 
congressional statutes evince neither formal approval nor formal disapproval, 
courts will sometimes have no choice but to translate the twilight zone’s “con-
temporary imponderables” into a concrete legal ruling. And, not surprisingly, 
the existing Category-Two analyses we have found reveal important variations, 
with different opinions articulating different types of reasons on behalf of their 
respective conclusions. Some opinions, for instance, have appeared to equate 
Category-Two action with Category-One action, extending the same strong 
presumption of constitutional validity that flows from an explicit act of con-
gressional authorization.14 Other opinions have treated Congress’s extended (or 
sometimes even short-term) failure to prohibit the challenged action as an indi-
cator of congressional “acquiescence” and have thereupon cited to that acqui-
escence as a reason to uphold what the President has done.15 Other opinions 
have gone further, scouring the legislative record for informal signs of Con-
gress’s attitude toward the action under review and treating legislative materi-
als of indirect relevance to the issue at hand as effectively dispositive of the 
constitutional question.16 And still other opinions have focused squarely on 
Article II, asking whether an ostensible Category-Two action sufficiently im-
plicates core presidential prerogatives as to pass constitutional muster whenev-
                                                                                                                           
 12 But see generally Medellín, 552 U.S. 491, aff’g Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315.  
 13 See infra Part II. 
 14 See infra Part II.A. 
 15 See infra Part II.B. 
 16 See infra Part II.C. 
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er Congress has failed to speak.17 Some of these opinions, of course, do more 
than just one of these things, mixing and matching, for instance, context-
specific arguments about congressional acceptance or acquiescence with ab-
stract arguments about inherent Article II authority.18 But none of these opin-
ions employs anything akin to a structured doctrinal analysis of the issue at 
hand. Indeed, if there is one shared feature of the universe of Category-Two 
opinions we have found, it is the fluid, amorphous, and largely ad hoc nature 
of the analyses they set forth. 
This universe of opinions is interesting and revealing in its own right. But 
it does not tell the entirety of our story. In addition to the challenge of engag-
ing with legal questions that fall within the zone of twilight, there also exists 
the antecedent challenge of identifying such questions in the first place. And, 
as the relatively small number of explicitly Category-Two opinions should it-
self make clear, courts have frequently managed not to declare that a chal-
lenged presidential action falls within the twilight zone at all. Sometimes, of 
course, this is an unsurprising and unremarkable result.19 But, at other times, 
the absence of Category-Two analysis looks more like the product of a deliber-
ate judicial choice, with courts actively circumventing the middle category by 
way of a practice that we call twilight-zone avoidance. In particular, we docu-
ment several ways in which courts have managed to dispose of Category Two-
like cases without ever wrestling with the “contemporary imponderables” that 
Justice Jackson himself invoked. Whether it is through strained statutory con-
structions that manage to extract some congressional guidance from ostensibly 
silent statutes,20 the application of rule-like substitutes for the twilight zone’s 
open-ended instructions,21 or the strategic invocation of justiciability-based 
grounds for dismissal,22 courts often find ways to steer clear of the zone of twi-
light in cases that arguably fall within its scope. 
These two phenomena that we describe—the courts’ confused and hap-
hazard approach to twilight-zone engagement and their frequent recourse to 
methods of twilight-zone avoidance—are not unrelated. Indeed, the two phe-
nomena are in some sense mutually reinforcing. The less that courts say about 
what twilight-zone analysis entails, the less attractive the zone of twilight be-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra Part II.D. 
 18 See, e.g., Chas. T. Main Int’l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 
1981) (emphasizing both a past history of congressional acquiescence to the presidential action under 
review and a superseding practical need to allow the action to move forward). 
 19 When Congress has indeed “spoken” to the validity of what the President has done, courts have 
no sound basis for invoking Justice Jackson’s middle category and instead properly situate their anal-
yses within either Category One or Category Three. 
 20 See infra Part III.A. 
 21 See infra Part III.B. 
 22 See infra Part III.C. 
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comes as a venue for constitutional decision-making. And the less attractive 
that twilight-zone analysis becomes, the more often that courts will manage to 
avoid engaging in it. A thin and murky precedential backdrop begets judicial 
circumvention, which in turn preserves that precedential backdrop’s thin and 
murky form. 
And that is largely where things stand today. Justice Jackson’s formally 
tripartite analysis has come to assume a largely bipartite form: Categories One 
and Three absorb the lion’s share of cases that implicate the Youngstown 
framework, while Category Two continues to languish in defunct and shape-
less form. We thus conclude our analysis by imagining what a more coherent 
and better-structured style of twilight-zone analysis might look like, proposing 
a method of engagement that would streamline and simplify the constitutional 
inquiry while remaining faithful to the middle category’s contextual and func-
tionalist spirit. In particular, we propose a method of twilight-zone engagement 
that scrutinizes presidential conduct along two separate and largely independ-
ent constitutional dimensions: (1) “congressional receptiveness” (i.e., the ex-
tent to which Congress, though formally silent about the merits of the Presi-
dent’s conduct, appears to have informally communicated its acceptance or 
non-acceptance of that conduct), and (2) Article II appropriateness (i.e., the 
extent to which the conduct aligns with independent executive branch powers, 
functions, and responsibilities). Actions that measure high along both axes 
should generally pass muster, actions that measure low along both generally 
should not, and actions that register conflicting results will require the most 
difficult judgment calls. There is, in other words, no escaping the possibility of 
hard cases and we do not pretend (nor would we want) to have made twilight-
zone analysis a mechanical and thoughtless exercise. But we do think our two-
dimensional conception of the twilight-zone’s contours at least helps to frame 
those cases in a manner that places the relevant separation-of-powers consider-
ations squarely before the reviewing court and the broader public as well. 
Here, then, is how the remainder of the Article proceeds. Part I revisits the 
Youngstown decision itself, tracing the origins of Justice Jackson’s Youngstown 
concurrence and underscoring the increasingly prominent place it has assumed 
within modern separation-of-powers jurisprudence. Part II then canvasses in-
stances of “twilight-zone engagement” from federal court cases, highlighting 
both the limited number of genuine, twilight-zone decisions and the substantial 
variability in these decisions’ methods of analysis. Part III then catalogues the 
related set of “twilight-zone avoidance” cases, identifying the different ways in 
which courts have managed to sidestep the vagaries of Justice Jackson’s mid-
dle category by characterizing plausible “twilight-zone” cases as instead impli-
cating some other set of doctrinal commands. Part IV then presents our pre-
scriptive suggestions as how future instances of twilight-zone analysis can and 
should proceed. 
748 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:741 
Before proceeding further, we pause to acknowledge that some readers 
might greet this topic with skepticism, questioning whether anything valuable 
remains to be said about a nearly seventy-year-old concurrence about which 
much has already been written. To that objection, we offer two responses. Our 
first response is to resist the suggestion that everything useful has already been 
said: that is, notwithstanding the aged and canonical status of Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence, we believe that both courts’ and commentators’ understanding of 
the tripartite framework (and, in particular, its middle category) remains un-
derexamined and incomplete.23 This is, admittedly, a point for which the reader 
must now take our word, but we hope that our ensuing analysis will provide 
reason enough for thinking that a sustained focus on both actual and would-be 
twilight-zone cases can still yield useful insights regarding the real world ap-
plication of the Justice Jackson framework itself. 
Our second response, meanwhile, is simply to emphasize the continued, if 
not increased, practical significance of the Justice Jackson framework to con-
temporary separation-of-powers disputes. As Professors Lisa Manheim and 
Kathryn Watts have shown, recent presidencies, and especially that of Donald 
Trump, have seen a “surge” in federal challenges to executive orders—
challenges that implicate not the familiar and well-established administrative 
law limits that govern the work of administrative agencies, but rather, the hazi-
er and still developing constitutional limits that govern presidential power it-
self.24 If this recent history is a harbinger of things to come, then Youngstown-
like questions will continue to arise. And the more frequently litigated those 
questions become, the more important it is that courts apply the Justice Jack-
son framework in a manner that reflects a full and conceptually sound under-
standing of all its constituent categories. 
I. THE TWILIGHT ZONE’S EMERGENCE 
A. The Origins of Justice Jackson’s Concurrence 
At the close of 1951, the United Steelworkers of America and steel-
industry management had been unable to consummate a new agreement, and 
as a result, the labor union declared a nationwide strike to commence on April 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Indeed, although there are many articles about Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework as a 
whole, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first full-length article to examine the zone of twilight 
in its own right. 
 24 Lisa Manheim & Kathryn A. Watts, Reviewing Presidential Orders, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 
1746–47, 1789 (2019). 
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9, 1952.25 Meanwhile, thousands of U.S. troops were involved in fighting in 
the Korean War, a conflict with no end in sight.26 On the eve of the pending 
labor strike, and in the absence of any specific congressional authorization, 
President Truman issued an executive order instructing the Secretary of Com-
merce “to take possession” of designated steel manufacturing plants, so as to 
prevent a “work stoppage [that] would immediately jeopardize and imperil our 
national defense.”27 Litigation ensued. In late April, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the order, find-
ing that the President lacked the constitutional authority to order the seizure.28 
The D.C. Circuit subsequently stayed the district court’s order,29 and from 
there the case headed to the Supreme Court.30 After hearing oral argument in 
May, the Court issued its decision in June, holding that the President’s seizure 
of the steel mills violated constitutional separation-of-powers requirements.31 
The immediate holding of Youngstown was crystal clear, but the reasoning 
behind it was not.32 The case generated multiple opinions.33 The majority opin-
                                                                                                                           
 25 See MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER 58–80 (1994) (providing a detailed account of the labor relations circumstances that preceded 
President Truman’s announcement of the seizure). 
 26 Phillip E. Stebbins, Truman and the Seizure of Steel: A Failure in Communication, THE HIS-
TORIAN, Nov. 1971, at 11. At the time of Truman’s announcement, the armed conflict in Korea had 
fallen into a stalemate. Id. at 11 & n.22 (“Though casualty figures kept rolling in, large scale offensive 
operations virtually stopped by 1952.”). 
 27 Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139, 3141 (Apr. 8, 1952). The President accompanied 
this order with a message to Congress that communicated his willingness to “cooperate in developing 
any legislative proposals [for handling the strike] which the Congress may wish to consider,” while 
also making clear his determination “to do all that is within [his] power to keep the steel industry 
operating” in the absence of congressional action. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 677 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 98 CONG. REC. 3912 (1952)). Twelve days later, 
the President restated his willingness to abide by any congressionally prescribed solution to the work 
stoppage, including a statute calling for the restoration of the seized properties. Id. Congress did not 
enact any legislation in response. Id. 
 28 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 576 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 343 U.S. 579 
(1952).  
 29 Sawyer v. U.S. Steel Co., 197 F.2d 582, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1952). 
 30 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 584 (majority opinion).  
 31 Id. at 588–89. 
 32 See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 691 
(1997) (“The six Justices in the Youngstown majority did not agree on a single rationale explaining the 
holding.”). 
 33 In addition to Justice Jackson, Justices Douglas, Burton, Clark, and Frankfurter also issued 
concurring opinions. Aside from Justice Jackson’s concurrence, Justice Frankfurter’s has likely been 
the most influential in subsequent separation-of-powers jurisprudence, particularly with respect to its 
suggestion that “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Con-
gress and never before questioned” should be treated as a “gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the 
President.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Bradley & Morri-
son, supra note 5, at 413 (discussing the impact and doctrinal consequences of the Frankfurter opinion 
in Youngstown). Jack Goldsmith and John Manning have noted, however, that Chief Justice Frederick 
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ion, authored by Justice Hugo Black, attempted to draw bright lines between 
the respective responsibilities of the President and Congress. “The President’s 
power, if any, to issue the order,” Justice Black explained, “must stem either 
from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself,”34 and here, according 
to the opinion, neither Congress nor the Constitution had given the President 
the power to act.35 Thus, for instance, as an “internal” act, the seizure of the 
steel mills was insufficiently connected to a “theater of war” to be justified as 
an exercise of the President’s powers as Commander in Chief.36 Similarly, the 
seizure was too “legislative” in nature to derive authorization from either Arti-
cle II’s Vesting Clause or its Take Care Clause.37 In short, as one commentator 
has put it, Justice Black demanded and found lacking “a clear constitutional 
basis for executive action or a clear legislative grant of authority to the execu-
tive by Congress.”38 
Justice Black’s opinion was straightforward enough on its own terms. Yet 
the five Justices who joined it all chose to write separately as well, outlining 
analyses of the case that expanded upon and in some instances deviated from 
what the majority opinion had said.39 This was especially true of Justice Jack-
son’s opinion, which, in contrast to the majority opinion’s formalism, em-
braced a more functionalist method of review.40 Recognizing that “[t]he actual 
art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judi-
cial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or 
even single Articles torn from context,” Justice Jackson instead embraced the 
view that presidential powers “are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon 
                                                                                                                           
Vinson’s dissenting opinion has itself experienced “a partial vindication” over time. See Jack Gold-
smith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2282 (2006). 
 34 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 587; id. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 37 Id. at 587–88 (majority opinion); see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (Vesting Clause); id. art. II, 
§ 3 (Take Care Clause). 
 38 Michael J. Turner, Comment, Fade to Black: The Formalization of Jackson’s Youngstown 
Taxonomy by Hamdan and Medellín, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 670 (2009). 
 39 Elizabeth Bahr & Josh Blackman, Youngstown’s Fourth Tier: Is There a Zone of Insight Be-
yond the Zone of Twilight?, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 541, 552 (2010) (“The six Justices in the majority did 
not agree on a single rationale, though they designated Justice Black’s opinion as the opinion of the 
Court.”); see Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that “the considera-
tions relevant to the legal enforcement of the principle of separation of powers seem to me more com-
plicated and flexible than may appear from what Mr. Justice Black has written,” and that “[e]ven 
though such differences in attitude toward this principle may be merely differences in emphasis and 
nuance, they can hardly be reflected by a single opinion for the Court”).  
 40 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in 
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 23–24 (1998); see also Harlan Grant 
Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
380, 394 (2015) (“Functionalism . . . is at the heart of Justice Jackson’s influential concurrence in 
Youngstown, now often read as the central opinion in that case.”). 
2021] The Elusive Zone of Twilight 751 
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”41 And that recogni-
tion prompted him to develop “a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practi-
cal situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his 
powers,” and to “distinguish[] roughly the legal consequences of this factor of 
relativity.”42 
Justice Jackson defined his groupings by reference to the relationship be-
tween the President’s conduct and congressional will.43 Into one category (Cat-
egory One) fell presidential actions taken “pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress.”44 For these actions, Justice Jackson maintained, 
presidential “authority is at its maximum,” and any finding of constitutionally 
invalidity would typically depend on a determination that “the Federal Gov-
ernment as an undivided whole lacks power.”45 Into another category (Catego-
ry Three) fell actions that were “incompatible with the expressed or implied 
will of Congress.”46 For these actions, the President’s “power is at its lowest 
ebb” and “must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilib-
rium established by our constitutional system.”47 
But that did not exhaust the full range of possibilities, as Jackson also 
pointed to an intermediate category (Category Two) of presidential actions that 
bore neither the stamp of congressional approval nor the badge of congression-
al rejection.48 More specifically, Justice Jackson explained: 
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent pow-
ers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have 
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. There-
fore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may some-
times, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on 
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of 
power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contempo-
rary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.49 
Beyond this paragraph, Justice Jackson did not elaborate much further on what 
the appropriate constitutional analysis within the “zone of twilight” ought to 
look like. That was so because, having presented his three categories, Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 42 Id. 
 43 See id. at 635–38. 
 44 Id. at 635. 
 45 Id. at 635–37. 
 46 Id. at 637. 
 47 Id. at 637–38. 
 48 Id. at 637. 
 49 Id. 
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Jackson then went on to conclude that Congress had “not left seizure of private 
property an open field” but instead had “covered it by three statutory policies 
inconsistent with” the President’s actions.50 Thus, Truman’s seizure order 
could be “justified only by the severe tests under the third grouping.”51 The 
remainder of the concurrence would go on to explain why the order failed 
those “severe tests.”52 
Justice Jackson’s concurrence was not met with immediate and universal 
acclaim.53 But over time, the concurrence—and, in particular, the tripartite 
framework it prescribed—would come to occupy a central place in the federal 
courts’ separation-of-powers jurisprudence. Beginning in the early 1970s,54 
lower court judges began to rely on the Jackson framework as the analytical 
vehicle for determining the outcome of various presidential power cases.55 By 
1981, a majority of Justices had characterized the Jackson framework as “ana-
lytically useful,”56 and by 2008, the Court had declared that “Justice Jackson’s 
familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework” for presidential 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. at 639. 
 51 Id. at 640. 
 52 Id. at 640–55. 
 53 See Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy of Youngstown, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 265 & 
n.6 (2010) (citing several negative reactions to Justice Jackson’s concurrence and concluding that 
Jackson’s “contemporaries were not bowled over”). 
 54 Prior to 1971, Justice Jackson’s framework appears to have only been used by the lower courts 
twice but not as reflecting binding law or as the analytical vehicle for determining the outcome of a 
case. See, e.g., United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 659 (4th Cir. 1953) (quoting Jus-
tice Jackson’s “lowest ebb” language in addition to the majority’s assertion that “the President’s pow-
er to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker” (first quot-
ing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 (majority opinion); and then quoting id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concur-
ring))); Zemel v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 65, 70 (D. Conn. 1964) (quoting Justice Jackson’s zone-of-
twilight language in pointing to the existence of concurrent powers). 
 55 See, e.g., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Le-
venthal, J., dissenting) (applying the Jackson framework in a case involving President Nixon’s effort 
to limit steel importations from other countries); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 32–34 (1st Cir. 
1971) (applying the Jackson framework in evaluating the justiciability of a challenge to the Presi-
dent’s initiation of military actions in Vietnam); Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa. v. Sec’y of Lab., 442 
F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 1971) (applying the Jackson framework in upholding an executive order con-
cerning the hiring practices of federal contractors). 
 56 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981). The Court in Dames & Moore did cau-
tion against an unduly rigid application of the framework, noting that “it is doubtless the case that 
executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but rather at 
some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congres-
sional prohibition.” Id. Nevertheless, the Court’s subsequent applications of the Jackson framework 
have tended to treat the three categories as discrete and bounded domains rather than mere shorthand 
references to points along a continuum. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 527 (2008) (con-
cluding, with respect to a particular theory of congressional authorization, that a form of presidential 
action was “within Justice Jackson’s third category, not the first or even the second”). 
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power cases.57 Most recently, the Jackson framework has factored into the 
judges’ analyses of high-profile legal disputes involving, among other things: 
President Trump’s travel ban,58 the issuance—and subsequent rescission—of 
the Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program,59 executive or-
ders designed to punish “sanctuary” jurisdictions,60 and the use of military 
commissions to try terrorism suspects.61 From humble beginnings as the organ-
izing principle for a non-binding, one-Justice concurrence, the Jackson frame-
work has grown into “an enduring and popular method for evaluating separa-
tion-of-powers questions.”62 
B. Post-Youngstown Guidance 
Popular as Justice Jackson’s framework has become, its middle category 
remains shrouded in mystery. Courts most frequently find that a challenged pres-
idential action falls within either Category One or Category Three, and few opin-
ions on the books both explicitly assign a challenged action to Category Two 
and evaluate that action by reference to the category’s open-ended standards.63 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 524. Just two years prior to Medellín, Professor Michael Gerhardt had 
identified Youngstown (and in particular the Jackson concurrence) as a sort of “super precedent” to 
which Supreme Court Justices “for years have given special deference.” Michael J. Gerhardt, Essay, 
Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1217 (2006); see Swaine, supra note 53, at 269 (“Over the 
long haul, but with a flurry near the end, Justice Jackson’s framework has been transformed into the 
Youngstown majority.”). 
 58 See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 287 (4th Cir.), vacated, 138 
S. Ct. 2710 (2018) (mem.). 
 59 See, e.g., Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957, 962 (9th Cir. 2017) (regarding initial 
establishment of DACA by President Obama); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 423 
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (regarding rescission of DACA by President Trump), vacated, Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020). 
 60 See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 61 See, e.g., Al Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 1, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, J., dissent-
ing), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 840 F.3d 757 (2016). 
 62 Kristen E. Eichensehr, Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, 85 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 609, 619 (2018). 
 63 It is, of course, difficult to quantify the relative frequency with which courts and individual 
judges have assigned different actions to each one of Jackson’s three categories. Nonetheless, in an 
attempt to pin down a rough indicator of Category Two’s popularity, we conducted a comprehensive 
survey of all decisions from the federal courts that included at least one citation to Youngstown itself. 
Of these decisions, we identified approximately one hundred as involving applications of the Jackson 
framework. And out of those applications of the framework, we identified no more than fifteen (in-
cluding those within individual concurrences or dissents) that could at least arguably be construed as 
engaging with Justice Jackson’s middle category. Several of these fifteen, moreover, did so only 
obliquely—mentioning the middle category only in dicta, see, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 
49 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc)—relying on it as an 
alternative ground for decision, see, e.g., Barquero v. United States, 18 F.3d 1311, 1314–16 (5th Cir. 
1994) (finding presidential action authorized under Category One and alternatively authorized under 
Category Two as well), or incorporating it into a discussion of the political question doctrine, see, e.g., 
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Part II of this Article will survey in detail the collection of Category-Two 
analyses that we have found within the lower courts’ own case law.64 But be-
fore considering those cases further, we begin with a brief survey of the zone 
of twilight’s own limited development at the Supreme Court. There are, in par-
ticular, three post-Youngstown decisions in which the Court has at least indi-
rectly offered guidance as to what a Category-Two analysis might entail. 
1. Dames & Moore v. Regan 
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Court rejected a separation-of-powers 
challenge to two executive actions related to the Iran Hostage Crisis.65 Rele-
vant for our purposes is the second of the two actions, an order that suspended 
the adjudication of claims against Iran pending in U.S. courts and transferred 
those claims to a specially constituted international tribunal for binding arbitra-
tion.66 In an opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist, the Court upheld that order. 
And it did so while at the same time acknowledging that neither of the statutes 
on which the government had relied—the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Hostage Act—“constitute[d] specific authoriza-
tion of the President’s action.”67 
How was the Court able to uphold a form of executive action that lacked 
“specific authorization” from Congress? Its key move was to emphasize “in-
ferences to be drawn from the character of the legislation Congress has enacted 
in the area . . . and from the history of acquiescence in executive claims set-
tlement.”68 Specifically, although neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act could 
be read to yield “specific authorization of the President’s action suspending 
claims,” both statutes remained “highly relevant in the looser sense of indicat-
ing congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circum-
stances such as those presented in this case.”69 What is more, Congress had 
also passed another statute, the International Claims Settlement Act (ICSA), 
which “creat[ed] a procedure to implement future settlement agreements” and 
thus “placed [Congress’s] stamp of approval on such agreements,”70 and it had 
                                                                                                                           
Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 26 (1st Cir. 1971). For further discussion of the Category-Two 
opinions we have located, see infra Part II. 
 64 See infra Part II. 
 65 See generally Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 66 See id. at 665–67. The first of those actions involved the nullification of attachment orders 
directed at designated Iranian assets. Id. at 669. The Court upheld that order as a Category-One meas-
ure, finding that it “was taken pursuant to specific statutory authorization.” Id. at 674 (citing Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 67 Id. at 677. 
 68 Id. at 686. 
 69 Id. at 677. 
 70 Id. at 680. 
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subsequently amended the ICSA “to provide for particular problems arising 
out of settlement agreements, thus demonstrating Congress’s continuing ac-
ceptance of the President’s claim settlement authority.”71 All of this had oc-
curred, moreover, against the backdrop of “a longstanding practice of settling 
such claims by executive agreement without the advice and consent of the 
Senate.”72 Quoting Justice Jackson’s earlier observation that “the enactment of 
legislation closely related to the question of the President’s authority in a par-
ticular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad dis-
cretion may be considered to ‘invite’ ‘measures on independent presidential 
responsibility,’”73 the Court thus concluded that this was just such a case. 
Thus, although the Court in Dames & Moore never explicitly character-
ized the suspension order as a form of Category-Two action,74 its acknowl-
edgment that the order lacked “specific authorization,” coupled with its direct 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id. at 681. 
 72 Id. at 679. 
 73 Id. at 678 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring)); see Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 567 (2005) 
(noting that the Court in Dames & Moore “aggregated delegations of statutory authority to find a 
power that it could not trace to any individual authorization, or even to any interlocking set of authori-
zations”). To be clear, the Court’s suggestion that the “general tenor” of the statutory backdrop 
evinced congressional acceptance of the President’s actions was by no means uncontroversial. As 
several commentators have noted, the relevant statutes might well have been construed differently, so 
as to reveal either congressional ambivalence regarding the President’s actions or perhaps even con-
gressional disapproval instead. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in 
Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1161 (2006) (“One might even conclude in light of explicit congressional 
approval in the past, Congress’s failure to authorize the executive agreements should be read as con-
gressional disapproval, putting the act not in Category One, but in Category Three.”). What is more, 
and as others have noted, by both conceding to a lack of “specific authorization” from Congress while 
at the same time highlighting Congress’s “acceptance” of what the President had done, the Court in 
Dames & Moore seemed to be muddling the doctrinal boundaries between Categories One and Two, 
effectively collapsing them both into a single, catch-all presumption in favor of the President. See, 
e.g., Jay S. Bybee & Tuan N. Samahon, William Rehnquist, the Separation of Powers, and the Riddle 
of the Sphinx, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1735, 1752 (2006) (noting that Dames & Moore might be read as 
“collaps[ing] Jackson’s tripartite classification into a two-tiered inquiry—shifting the Iranian hostage 
crisis into Jackson category one . . . rather than Jackson category two”); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, 
The Steel Seizure Case: One of a Kind?, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 63, 83 n.116 (2002) (“[I]n Dames and 
Moore, the Court signaled that the burden of proof should be shifted away from the president and to 
the Congress.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: 
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1310 (1988) (contending that the Court in 
Dames & Moore “elevat[ed] the President’s power from the ‘twilight zone’ . . . to its height in Jackson 
Category One”); Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Separation of Pow-
ers After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 948–49 (2007) (“In finding clear 
statutory acquiescence in President Carter’s actions in a statute that was, at best, ambiguous, Justice 
Rehnquist effectively vitiated Jackson’s taxonomy—or, at least, turned it on its head.”). 
 74 See Bybee & Samahon, supra note 73, at 1752 (noting that “Rehnquist never says under which 
of the Jackson categories the President’s suspension of the claims actually falls”); Ganesh Sitaraman 
& Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1957 (2015) 
(“[T]he Court did not even clearly assign the case to one of the three Youngstown categories.”). 
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invocation of Justice Jackson’s reference to “measures on independent presi-
dential responsibility,” left little doubt as to where within the framework the Jus-
tices understood the order to fall.75 The suspension order implicated the Jackson 
framework’s middle category.76 And it passed muster within that category be-
cause a group of loosely on-point statutes together signaled Congress’s “acquies-
cence” to a “longstanding practice” to which the order itself belonged.77 
2. American Insurance Association v. Garamendi 
Some twenty-two years after Dames & Moore, the Court once again—
albeit quite tentatively—wandered into the twilight zone’s murky territory. 
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi addressed whether a California 
statute was preempted by federal law, based upon the statute’s perceived in-
compatibility with executive agreements between the United States and the 
governments of Austria, France, and Germany.78 The statute, of course, could 
only be preempted if the executive agreements themselves were valid, and the 
Court thus began its analysis by explaining why they were. Citing to Dames & 
Moore, Justice Souter’s majority opinion noted that “our cases have recognized 
that the President has authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with other 
countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress.”79 
That practice, the Court continued, “goes back over 200 years, and has re-
ceived congressional acquiescence throughout its history.”80 Consequently, 
there was not “any question” that the President had the authority to consum-
mate the agreements with which the California law was said to conflict.81 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677–78. 
 76 At least one set of commentators has suggested otherwise, understanding the Court to have 
upheld the suspension order directly under Category One. See Andrew Coan & Nicholas Bullard, 
Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, 102 VA. L. REV. 765, 810 (2016) (noting that “the Court 
placed the suspension of claims in Justice Jackson’s first category”). But in our view, and as several 
other commentators have recognized, this portion of Dames & Moore is better understood as involv-
ing a Category-Two analysis. That follows from both the Court’s express reliance on Jackson’s own 
description of Category-Two cases, and its concession that Congress had never “authoriz[ed]” the 
action under review. See, e.g., Bahr & Blackman, supra note 39, at 567 (asserting that “[w]ith respect 
to the suspension of the claims, the Supreme Court found that the action fell into the Tier Two zone of 
twilight because it was not explicitly authorized by Congress”); E. Garrett West, A Youngstown for 
the Administrative State, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 643 (2018) (noting that the Court in Dames & 
Moore “analyze[d] the question under Category II”); Turner, supra note 38, at 678 (noting that “the 
Court placed the suspension of claims into the ‘zone of twilight’ category”). 
 77 Id. at 678–79. 
 78 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003). 
 79 Id. at 415 (quoting Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 679, 682–83). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 414. 
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In one sense, Garamendi has very little to do with Justice Jackson’s con-
currence; the Court in Garamendi never actually described the tripartite 
framework, and it certainly never made reference to the middle category in 
particular. At the same time, however, the case relied heavily on Dames & 
Moore, and in that sense, as Doug Kysar and Bernadette Meyler have noted, 
“Youngstown . . . could be seen as lurking in the background.”82 Most im-
portantly, like Rehnquist’s opinion in Dames & Moore, Justice Souter’s ma-
jority opinion in Garamendi treated informal indicators of congressional ac-
quiescence as sufficient to sustain forms of presidential action that Congress 
had not explicitly authorized.83 
Indeed, Garamendi might if anything have managed to expand Dames & 
Moore’s reach.84 In Dames & Moore, it was not mere congressional silence 
that supported the Court’s inference of acquiescence, but rather a “general ten-
or” of congressional acceptance—reflected in thematically related congres-
sional enactments—that helped to justify what the President had done.85 In 
Garamendi, by contrast, the Court did not even bother to highlight any con-
gressional enactments that seemed to evince even indirect receptiveness to the 
agreement under review.86 Put differently, whereas the Court in Dames & 
Moore had pointed to discrete congressional actions as validating Congress’s 
acceptance of the President’s claim-suspension agreement, the Court in Gara-
mendi pointed only to mere absence of congressional opposition as affirming a 
much broader authority to enter into executive agreements more generally. 
Congressional silence and historical practice thus together sufficed to validate 
a form of unilateral executive action that Congress had neither approved of nor 
rejected in any formal way.87 
                                                                                                                           
 82 Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621, 1645 
(2008). 
 83 Id. (characterizing Justice Souter’s opinion as holding that, “[b]ecause Congress had responded 
to prior presidential efforts to settle Americans’ claims against foreign governments with ‘inertia, 
indifference or quiescence,’ the Court was entitled to assume that the president’s actions represented a 
legitimate exercise of power within the ‘zone of twilight’” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))); see Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678–
79 (same). 
 84 Further, as Brannon Denning and Michael Ramsey have noted, Garamendi did not in any way 
acknowledge the “limiting language” in Dames & Moore that “disclaimed an intent to establish the 
broad proposition that the President can settle its citizens’ claims by executive agreement.” Brannon 
P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive 
Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 895 (2004). 
 85 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678. 
 86 See 539 U.S. at 414 (noting that the Constitution gives the president “a degree of independent 
authority” to conduct foreign affairs). 
 87 Id. at 414–15. 
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3. Medellín v. Texas 
The Court’s most recent encounter with the zone of twilight, in Medellín 
v. Texas, was also indirect.88 The petitioner in that case sought to invalidate a 
state criminal conviction, claiming that Texas had secured the conviction while 
acting in disregard of an International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision concern-
ing U.S. treaty obligations under the Vienna Convention and the United Na-
tions Charter.89 In the wake of the ICJ judgment, President George W. Bush 
had issued a memorandum indicating that the United States would “discharge 
its international obligations” and instructing state courts to “give effect to the 
decision.”90 But Texas ignored the instruction, contending that neither the ICJ 
decision on its own terms nor the President’s subsequent memorandum re-
quired it to revisit the petitioner’s case.91 That claim implicated the Jackson 
framework insofar as it hinged on Texas’s position that the President lacked the 
authority to effectuate the ICJ’s judgment on his own.92 
Writing for the majority in Medellín, Chief Justice John Roberts began his 
analysis of the presidential power question by reciting the Jackson framework 
and describing its three categories.93 He then considered whether, as the United 
States had attempted to argue, the treaties at issue in the ICJ judgment—which 
had been ratified by the Senate—constituted a form of congressional authori-
zation that would implicate Category One.94 They did not, according to the 
Chief Justice, because the relevant treaty provisions were “non-self-executing” 
and thus lacked “domestic effect of [their] own force.”95 In fact, Chief Justice 
Roberts continued, the non-self-executing nature of the treaties did more than 
merely fail to authorize the President to enforce the ICJ judgment against Tex-
as; they also “implicitly prohibit[ed] him from doing so,” because any unilat-
eral attempt by the President to make the judgment binding on domestic courts 
would be “in conflict with the implicit understanding of the ratifying Sen-
ate.”96 The President’s actions, then, ultimately fell “within Justice Jackson’s 
                                                                                                                           
 88 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 89 Id. at 497–98. 
 90 Id. at 498. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 525–26. 
 93 Id. at 524–25. In an eerie web of twilight-zone coincidences, Chief Justice Roberts had served 
as then-Justice Rehnquist’s law clerk during the term in which Dames & Moore was decided, just as 
Rehnquist had served as Justice Jackson’s law clerk during the term in which Youngstown was decid-
ed. See Bybee & Samahon, supra note 73, at 1737 (noting that Justice Rehnquist clerked for Justice 
Jackson during that term); Koh, supra note 73, at 1161 (noting that Chief Justice Roberts assisted in 
drafting the Dames & Moore opinion when he was a clerk to Justice Rehnquist). 
 94 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 525. 
 95 Id. at 527. 
 96 Id. 
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third category, not the first or even the second.”97 And that in turn rendered the 
question of congressional acquiescence irrelevant because, “[u]nder the 
Youngstown tripartite framework, congressional acquiescence is pertinent 
when the President’s action falls within the second category”—a category that 
the Chief Justice’s earlier analysis had already ruled out.98 
Having ruled out the “second category” in relation to the government’s 
treaty-enforcement argument, Chief Justice Roberts then turned to an “argument 
. . . of a different nature than the one rejected above.”99 According to that argu-
ment, the President’s power to require compliance with the ICJ judgment de-
rived not from the treaties that the memorandum purported to enforce, but rather 
from “an independent source of authority” recognized in the past “claims-
settlement cases”—that is, Garamendi, Dames & Moore, and their earlier, pre-
Youngstown predecessors.100 Those cases, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged, 
did establish that “‘a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to 
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,’ can ‘raise a pre-
sumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent.’”101 But 
the cases had no relevance here,102 as the Government had not  
identified a single instance in which the President has attempted (or 
Congress has acquiesced in) a Presidential directive issued to state 
courts, much less one that reaches deep into the heart of the State’s 
police powers and compels state courts to reopen final criminal 
judgments and set aside neutrally applicable state laws.103  
Consequently, although Chief Justice Roberts never expressly characterized 
this theory of presidential authority as dependent on an interpretation of Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 528. Chief Justice Roberts also argued in the alternative that, even if pertinent, such ac-
quiescence had not been shown, finding that the “authority expressly conferred by Congress in the 
international realm cannot be said to ‘invite’ the Presidential action at issue here.” Id. at 530 (quoting 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)); see 
Swaine, supra note 53, at 330 n.239 (characterizing this part of the Medellín opinion as “separately 
address[ing] the president’s argument that, in the alternative, the memorandum should be evaluated 
under Category Two”). 
 99 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 528, 530–31. 
 100 Id. at 531–32; see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (noting that “[t]he 
powers of the President in the conduct of foreign relations included the power, without consent of the 
Senate, to determine the public policy of the United States with respect to the Russian nationalization 
decrees”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 327 (1937) (noting that “no state policy can pre-
vail against [an] international compact”). Again, the Court never explicitly invoked Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence during the course of this discussion, but its reliance on Dames & Moore can at least be 
read as indirectly implicating Youngstown. 
 101 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 531 (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981)). 
 102 See id. at 532 (describing the presidential action at issue as “unprecedented”). 
 103 Id. 
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Jackson’s Category Two,104 he would ultimately conclude that the asserted 
power “to settle international claims disputes pursuant to an executive agree-
ment” could not “stretch so far” as to encompass the “unprecedented action” 
that the memorandum had purported to undertake.105 
* * * 
As guidance about the twilight zone’s contours, these three cases add up 
to not a whole lot. Dames & Moore—the only one of the three to acknowledge 
explicitly the Category-Two nature of the action it considered—suggests that a 
“general tenor” of congressional support can suffice to sustain Category-Two 
action, particularly where that action has a longstanding historical pedigree.106 
Garamendi suggests that inferences of acquiescence to longstanding forms of 
action might sometimes be drawn even in the absence of such indirectly rele-
vant legislation.107 And Medellín suggests that, at other times, similar infer-
ences cannot be so easily drawn.108 Those three instructions—all concerning 
the same particular type of presidential action—hardly amount to a recipe for 
clear and coherent twilight-zone analysis and thus leave many important ques-
tions unresolved. As far as the Court’s own case law is concerned, the “con-
temporary imponderables” that apply to twilight-zone action remain very much 
in place. Let us now then see whether the lower courts have managed to shed 
any additional light. 
II. TWILIGHT-ZONE ENGAGEMENT 
As the previous Part demonstrated, the Supreme Court’s own engagement 
with the twilight zone has been sporadic and shallow, leaving much unresolved 
about the middle category’s substance and contours.109 But the Court is not the 
only judicial institution that considers questions of presidential power; the 
lower federal courts sometimes confront these questions as well. In so doing, 
                                                                                                                           
 104 There remains one puzzle that Chief Justice Roberts did not, in our view, adequately resolve: 
If, as Roberts had earlier concluded, the relevant treaties “implicitly prohibited” any executive branch 
attempt to give them domestic effect, why would the President have been able to rely on some alterna-
tive source of power to do the same thing? See id. at 527. That is, having earlier found that the Presi-
dent was operating within Category Three for treaty-enforcement purposes, Chief Justice Roberts 
seemed to dispense with that finding when analyzing whether the memorandum might alternatively be 
justified as a (presumably) Category-Two measure instead. But how could the memorandum in any 
sense be regarded as a Category-Two measure if there already existed a form of federal law—i.e., the 
non-self-executing treaties—that “implicitly prohibited” the President from issuing the memorandum 
itself? See id. 
 105 Id. at 532. 
 106 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678. 
 107 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414–15 (2003). 
 108 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 527–28. 
 109 See supra Part I. 
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the lower courts often taken guidance from the Youngstown framework and 
sometimes, as we will see, attempt to navigate their own way through the mid-
dle category’s murky waters. 
This Part thus presents an overview of efforts in the lower courts to eval-
uate presidential action within the zone of twilight. The analysis yields two 
primary takeaways. The first takeaway relates to the relative paucity of 
acknowledged Category-Two cases. What we are presenting here is not so 
much a representative sample of Category-Two opinions, but rather the vast 
majority (if not the entirety) of cases in which lower courts have conducted 
their separation-of-powers analyses within the twilight zone’s domain. That 
this body of cases can be so comprehensively summarized and discussed with-
in a single section of a law review article is itself an indicator of how few Cat-
egory-Two decisions have been rendered over time. 
The second takeaway relates to the relative variability of the opinions 
themselves—opinions that go about engaging with the zone of twilight in dif-
ferent and sometimes conflicting ways. With one important exception that we 
discuss in Part III,110 Justice Jackson’s zone of twilight has thus far proven re-
sistant to any significant forms of “rulification” or “specification” that would 
yield uniform application across cases. This finding might at first glance seem 
unsurprising; why, after all, would one expect a test expressly predicated on 
“contemporary imponderables” to yield a consistent set of outcomes over 
time? But the takeaway is at least somewhat noteworthy given that courts often 
manage to devise concrete and consistent instructions to guide their application 
of even the most open-ended doctrinal commands.111 That no such develop-
ment has occurred in connection with the Youngstown framework helps to un-
derscore the unusually high degree of fluidity and flexibility across cases. In-
deed, nearly seventy years after its original articulation, the test remains open-
ended, unconstrained, and still amenable to a variety of different interpreta-
tions and analyses. 
Indeed, and as the discussion below uncovers, the lower courts’ applica-
tions of the Youngstown framework reveal at least four different approaches to 
evaluating the constitutionality of presidential actions within the middle cate-
gory. The first automatically infers from Congress’s silence an implied ac-
ceptance of the challenged conduct, effectively erasing the distinction between 
Justice Jackson’s first two categories. The second treats congressional silence 
in a more contextual manner, understanding such silence to signal acquies-
cence to the President’s conduct where, for instance, Congress has repeatedly 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See infra Part III.B.ii. 
 111 See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 674–80 (2014) (catalogu-
ing substantive domains within which the Court and lower courts have collaboratively worked to give 
content and specification to originally quite open-ended doctrinal commands).  
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declined or failed to stop the sort of conduct under review. The third approach 
places emphasis on informal indicators of congressional acceptance (or non-
acceptance), using the legislative record and only indirectly on-point laws to 
draw inferences about Congress’s overall attitude toward the action under re-
view. And the fourth approach trains its focus directly on Article II, asking, in 
effect, whether the Category-Two action comports with the President’s distinc-
tive constitutional responsibilities. 
A. Silence as Authorization 
One method of Category-Two engagement treats the presence of congres-
sional silence as functionally no different from the presence of congressional 
authorization, thus treating the second category as effectively no different form 
the first. 
Consider in this respect the Third Circuit’s 1971 opinion in Contractors 
Ass’n of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor.112 This case concerned an 
executive order that, in effect, required bidders on federal or federally assisted 
construction contracts to utilize affirmative action programs in their hiring 
practices.113 Challengers to the program contended that the President lacked 
the authority to implement this policy unilaterally, and the court treated their 
claim as squarely implicating the Youngstown framework.114 Applying that 
framework, the court then highlighted the federal government’s “vital interest 
in assuring that the largest possible pool of qualified manpower be available 
for the accomplishment of its projects.”115 And it further explained that 
when the Congress authorizes an appropriation for a program of 
federal assistance, and authorizes the Executive branch to imple-
ment the program by arranging for assistance to specific projects, in 
the absence of specific statutory regulations it must be deemed to 
have granted to the President a general authority to act for the pro-
tection of federal interests.116 
The court thus seemed headed toward a Category-One conclusion,117 set 
to justify the President’s actions by reference to whatever appropriations stat-
                                                                                                                           
 112 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971). 
 113 Id. at 162–63. 
 114 Id. at 167–68. 
 115 Id. at 171. 
 116 Id.; see Stack, supra note 73, at 566 n.138 (describing the court’s analysis in Contractors as 
“concluding that the president’s executive orders were authorized unless they were prohibited by 
statute”). 
 117 For other decisions about this order that chose not to invoke Category Two, see, for example, 
United States v. N.O. Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 466, 467 n.8 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that “[a]t 
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utes had conferred on the President the authority to issue the order under re-
view. But its analysis then took a surprising turn; having suggested that the 
President’s actions could be upheld as authorized by Congress, the court then 
asserted that “[i]f such action has not been authorized by Congress (Justice 
Jackson’s first category), at the least it falls within the second category.”118 
And it was no less valid under the second category because “[i]f no congres-
sional enactments prohibit what has been done, the Executive action is val-
id.”119 The remainder of the court’s separation-of-powers analysis thus pro-
ceeded to demonstrate that no federal statutes did in fact impose such a prohi-
bition.120 Consequently, as a form of non-prohibited executive action within 
either Category One or Two, the executive order could stand. 
A similar blending of Categories One and Two appears the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California’s 2003 opinion, Anderman 
v. Federal Republic of Austria.121 There, the plaintiffs sought to recover dam-
ages (and other remedies) from the Austrian government for its complicity in 
Nazi-era property confiscations.122 Their efforts would ultimately founder on 
political-question grounds, but not without first implicating a Youngstown 
analysis of prior presidential action. Specifically, the defendants had pointed to 
a 2001 executive agreement between the United States and Austria as preclud-
ing the plaintiffs’ demand for judicial relief, and the plaintiffs had responded 
by arguing that the President had lacked the authority to enter into the agree-
ment in the first place.123 Thus, in order to determine, for political-question 
purposes, whether the plaintiffs’ case threatened to “embarrass and undermine 
the Executive’s authority in foreign affairs,”124 the court needed first to deter-
mine, essentially on the merits, whether that authority had been properly exer-
cised in the first place. 
And on that question, the District Court’s conclusion was straightforward. 
Simply put, in formulating the 2001 agreement, “the Executive did not act in 
                                                                                                                           
the least, there has been implied congressional approval” and that the action thus “[fell] within the 
first category of executive power—that of maximum power—which Justice Jackson identified in his 
concurring opinion in Youngstown”), vacated, 436 U.S. 942 (1978) (mem.), and Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Friedman, 639 F.2d 164, 172 n.13 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding the order invalid because it was not 
authorized by Congress and citing to Justice Black’s majority opinion in Youngstown for the proposi-
tion that the President lacks “inherent powers” to undertake “legislation action . . . in the absence of 
any delegation of lawmaking power by the Congress”). 
 118 Contractors, 442 F.2d at 171. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 171–76. 
 121 256 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
 122 Id. at 1101–02. 
 123 Id. at 1115–17. 
 124 Id. at 1115. 
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contravention to Congressional will.”125 Consequently, the “Executive acted at 
least at the second [Youngstown] level, and . . . no authority suggests that Con-
gress would have disapproved of the Executive Agreement.”126 And with no 
indicator of congressional disapproval before it, the Court could “not find that 
the Executive branch acted outside its authority in entering into the 2001 Ex-
ecutive Agreement.”127 
In short, both the Contractors and Anderman decisions appeared to treat 
Category-Two actions as enjoying the same level of presumptive constitutional 
validity as their Category-One counterparts. To the judges deciding both cases, 
it did not matter whether the relevant executive action fell within Justice Jack-
son’s first or second category because, either way, the absence of a prohibiting 
statute was in itself sufficient to establish that action’s constitutional validi-
ty.128 (Hence the ability of both courts to characterize the challenged actions as 
falling “at least” within the second category, without having to conclude de-
finitively whether the actions did or did not enjoy actual congressional authori-
zation.129) To be sure, more might well have been going on beneath the sur-
face; perhaps both courts had good reason to conclude that the particular types 
of actions before them should have enjoyed Category-One-like status even 
when placed against a backdrop of congressional silence.130 (Conversely, one 
similarly might imagine other circumstances in which the presence of congres-
sional silence is, for all intents and purposes, equivalent to a Category-Three-
                                                                                                                           
 125 Id. at 1116. 
 126 Id. at 1117. Throughout this discussion, the court attributed the tripartite framework to the 
Court’s decision in Dames & Moore rather than to Youngstown itself. Id. 
 127 Anderman, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. 
 128 See, e.g., Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa. v. Sec’y of Lab., 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 1971) (“If 
no congressional enactments prohibit what has been done, the Executive action is valid.”). This will-
ingness to equate congressional silence with congressional authorization was also hinted at in the 
court’s suggestion in the Contractors case that Justice Jackson’s second category encompasses “action 
in which the President has implied power to act in the absence of congressional preemption.” Id. at 
168. 
 129 Anderman, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1117; see also M.C. West, Inc. v. Lewis, 522 F. Supp. 338, 344 
(M.D. Tenn. 1981) (noting that the court in Contractors held that the executive order “fell within 
Justice Jackson’s first two categories” (citing Contractors, 442 F.2d at 170–71)). 
 130 For instance, in Contractors, the court did note that its valid-unless-prohibited conclusion was 
rendered “[p]articularly” true by the fact that “Congress, aware of Presidential action with respect to 
federally assisted construction projects since June of 1963, ha[d] continued to make appropriations for 
such projects.” 442 F.2d at 171. And the court in Anderman did say, albeit without further elaboration, 
that “no authority suggests that Congress would have disapproved of the Executive Agreement,” thus 
perhaps alluding to some additional considerations beyond the mere presence of congressional silence. 
256 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. Thus, charitably read, both opinions might still prove compatible with the 
somewhat weaker proposition that Category-Two action is valid if it is accompanied by a lengthy 
history of congressional acquiescence. See infra Part II.B. 
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like finding of congressional prohibition.131) But in terms of the actual opin-
ions themselves, both courts appeared to treat the so-called zone of twilight as 
involving not much twilight at all.132 
B. Silence as Acquiescence 
A second approach to twilight-zone analysis shares with the first approach 
its tendency to accord a strong presumption of validity to presidential action 
undertaken in the face of legislative silence. But, unlike the first approach, this 
approach arrives at that presumption by means of a particularized and context-
specific inference about congressional intent. In particular, this approach builds 
on the suggestion of Justice Jackson himself that, within the zone of twilight, 
“congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a 
practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential 
responsibility.”133 Put differently, congressional silence might sometimes cre-
ate space for executive action that, over time—and on account of that si-
lence—assumes increased constitutional legitimacy. Although Congress’s atti-
tude might not rise to the level of “implied authorization” sufficient to impli-
cate Category One directly, it might still reveal enough “indifference or quies-
                                                                                                                           
 131 Consider in this respect a district court opinion from 1994, in the case of Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota. 853 F. Supp. 1118 (D. Minn. 1994), aff’d, 124 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 
1997), aff’d, Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999). The court 
there considered the validity of an 1850 Executive Order (issued by then-President Zachary Taylor) 
that purported to terminate the usufructuary rights conferred by an 1837 treaty between the United 
States and several Bands of Chippewa Indians. The court rejected that claim, holding that the 1850 
order was invalid because it had never been authorized by Congress. See id. at 1142–43. What is 
more, and in contrast to the decisions in Contractors and Anderman, the court went on to explain why, 
with respect to the particular claim before it, the demonstrated lack of congressional authorization was 
in and of itself sufficient to resolve the separation-of-powers question. That was so, the court ex-
plained, because “the Constitution did not provide President Taylor with the power to revoke treaty 
rights” and “[u]nder the Constitution, Congress has plenary authority over Indian affairs.” Id. at 1142. 
Here, in other words, Congress’s silence on the subject had the same functional effect as a direct pro-
hibition: a lack of express congressional authorization to override the terms of the duly ratified treaty 
itself made clear that the President had acted beyond the scope of his constitutional authority. See 
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 861 F. Supp. 784, 828 (D. Minn. 1994) (“Alt-
hough the President has the ‘power, by and with the consent of the Senate, to make treaties’, Congress 
has plenary authority over Indian affairs. Only Congress can abrogate an Indian treaty right by ex-
pressing that intention clearly and plainly. Ratification of the 1837 treaty was not a clear and plain 
expression of Congressional intent to allow the President to remove the Chippewa without their con-
sent, particularly because the treaty does not even mention removal.” (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2)), aff’d, 124 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1997), aff’d, Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).  
 132 See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 791–92 n.40 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (expressing disagreement with the Third Circuit’s conclusion in Contractors that the 
President had “acted within his ‘implied authority’” and emphasizing that “much uncertainty attends 
any claim of ‘implied’ or ‘inherent’ presidential authority under the Constitution”). 
 133 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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cence” to tip the scale in the President’s favor within Category Two itself. Si-
lence implies constitutional validity because that silence, understood in con-
text, seems to indicate that Congress is on the President’s side. 
Consider in this respect the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Barquero v. United 
States.134 The United States and Mexico had entered into a Tax Information 
Exchange Agreement (TIEA), pursuant to which each country would share 
with the other certain types of tax-related records.135 The challenger contended 
that the (U.S.) President lacked constitutional authority to enter into this 
agreement. But the court disagreed, finding in two sections of the Internal 
Revenue Code “specific congressional authorization for the President’s deci-
sion to enter into the challenged TIEA.”136 That passage in and of itself pres-
aged a Category-One holding. But the court from there went on to note that, 
even if its Category-One analysis was wrong, the President’s action would still 
have been valid under Category Two.137 And that was so in part because “there 
exists a history, albeit a short one, of congressional acquiescence in the Presi-
dent’s concluding TIEAs with non-beneficiary countries, and Congress has not 
questioned the power of the President to conclude such agreements.”138 In par-
ticular, the Court pointed out that the President had recently signed TIEAs with 
other countries “without any indication of congressional disapproval.”139 Put 
differently, the issue had already been teed up before Congress, and Congress 
had chosen not to act. And its inaction in the face of an easy opportunity to 
object thus helped to bolster the conclusion that the President had acted with 
Congress’s implied consent.140 
Acquiescence-based logic of this sort also guided the D.C. Circuit’s deci-
sion in American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,141 a 
pre-Dames & Moore v. Regan decision concerning the same claims-suspension 
                                                                                                                           
 134 18 F.3d 1311, 1313–16 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 135 Id. at 1313. 
 136 Id. at 1315. 
 137 Id. at 1314–15. 
 138 Id. at 1315. 
 139 Id. at 1315 n.13. 
 140 The Court’s Category-Two analysis did not rest exclusively on this conclusion. The Court also 
held that a recent amendment to the Internal Revenue Code has also signaled “‘implicit approval’ for 
the President’s actions” and thus “constitute[d] an ‘invitation’ . . . to enter into TIEAs with non-
beneficiary countries.” Id. at 1315 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). In addition, and somewhat puzzlingly, the Court also noted that 
“the Senate appears to have given its explicit approval to the TIEA at issue when it ratified the United 
States–Mexico comprehensive income tax convention in November 1993.” Id. at 1315–16. The court 
thus seemed to imply that the Senate’s ratification of an Article II treaty, though perhaps insufficient 
to bring the President’s actions into Category-One analysis, still sufficed to support a finding that 
Category-Two action was constitutionally valid. 
 141 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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order that the Court would later uphold.142 As far as the D.C. Circuit was con-
cerned, that suspension order “was an example of a continual executive prac-
tice in which the Congress has, at the very least, acquiesced.”143 Specifically, 
the Court pointed to “a long-standing practice of settling private American 
claims against foreign governments through executive agreements,”144 that was 
“fortified by the statements of distinguished judges through the years.”145 What 
was more, and “[o]f especial significance in this ‘zone of twilight,’” was the 
limited and subject-specific manner in which Congress had previously voiced 
its opposition to prior claim-settlement agreements.146 In particular, the court 
pointed to an earlier instance in which Congress had passed a law requiring the 
President to renegotiate a claim-settlement agreement with Czechoslovakia.147 
That law showed that Congress knew how to show its opposition to claims-
settlement agreements when it wanted to do so, thus supporting the inference 
that Congress had “apparently chosen not to act” in response to the President’s 
agreement with Iran.148 
                                                                                                                           
 142 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 657–88 (1981). 
 143 Am. Int’l Grp., 657 F.2d at 439. 
 144 Id. at 444. In highlighting this point, the D.C. Circuit referenced Justice Frankfurter’s separate 
Youngstown opinion and its suggestion that “[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of conducting gov-
ernment . . . [can] give meaning to the words of a text or supply them.” Id. at 443 (quoting Youngs-
town, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 145 Id. at 445. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. Notably, and in contrast to the agreement with Iran, the Czechoslovakia agreement on its 
own terms was conditioned on congressional approval. See R.B. Lillich, Editorial Comment, The 
Gravel Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974: Congress Checkmates a Presidential Lump Sum 
Agreement, 69 AM. J. INT’L L. 837, 840 (1975) (noting that the agreement was “conditioned upon the 
U.S. granting most-favored-nation treatment and other economic benefits to Czechoslovakia, the be-
stowal of which by the Executive requires prior congressional authorization” and that the President 
“had little choice . . . but to seek such authorization” (footnote omitted)). Thus, the circumstances 
presented in that case were somewhat more conducive to congressional intervention than were the 
circumstances presented in American International and the other Iran-agreement cases. Whether that 
distinction should have made a difference was a question that the D.C. Circuit never discussed. 
 148 Am. Int’l Grp., 657 F.2d at 445. One final example of this reasoning is illustrated by a subse-
quently withdrawn Ninth Circuit opinion that addressed the validity of a presidentially initiated policy 
of denying official recognition to “an ‘Armenian Genocide.’” See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung 
AG, 578 F.3d 1052, 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009), withdrawn, 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010). Specifical-
ly, Congress had on several occasions initiated work on legislative resolutions that would have offi-
cially recognized the Armenian genocide, on each occasion “[t]he President and his senior officials 
[had] lobbied Congress, privately and publicly” against it, and “[e]ach time, Congress deferred to the 
President’s authority, and did not bring the Resolution to a vote.” Id. at 1060. Under these circum-
stances, the lack of formal legislative guidance actually counted as a form of “congressional acquies-
cence” that “infuse[d] the President’s authority to act with additional support.” Id. Thus, to the extent 
the policy “implicated a power shared by the President and Congress, Congress’s documented defer-
ence in this case lends the presidential policy additional authority.” Id. 
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C. “General Tenor” Analysis 
A third method of twilight-zone analysis also blurs the boundaries between 
Categories One and Two. But whereas the first two methods do so by treating 
congressional silence as akin to authorization, this method relies on affirmative 
(though sometimes quite subtle) indicators of congressional approval (or disap-
proval) that appear within the legislative record itself. These indicators might not 
be strong enough to demonstrate the sort of “implied authorization” that would 
traditionally implicate Category One, but, the argument goes, they still carry 
enough weight to tip the scale in favor of the President within Category Two it-
self. What this form of Category-Two analysis relies on, in other words, is not so 
much a single, hard indicator of actual legislative authorization, but rather a set 
of soft indicators of a receptive congressional posture. 
The “general tenor” approach is perhaps best embodied by the Court’s 
own opinion in Dames & Moore, which, as we have already seen, pointed to 
multiple congressional enactments as informally signaling Congress’s “ac-
ceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as those 
presented in this case.”149 It also bears some resemblance to the suggestion 
offered by Chief Justice Vinson in his Youngstown dissent that Congress had 
instituted a number of “legislative programs,” the “successful execution” of 
which “depends upon continued production of steel and stabilized prices for 
steel.”150 And the approach has surfaced within lower court opinions as well. 
Consider, for instance, the First Circuit’s decision in Massachusetts v. 
Laird,151 one of several Vietnam-era cases challenging the President’s constitu-
tional authority to prosecute the war.152 The Youngstown analysis in Laird ap-
peared in the midst of a political-question-based holding, with the court treating 
the apparent constitutional appropriateness of the President’s military engage-
ment as a reason to avoid reaching the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.153 Put dif-
                                                                                                                           
 149 453 U.S. 654, 677 (1981). 
 150 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 672 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissent-
ing); see Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 33, at 2285 (noting that “Vinson thought the President 
possessed a residual capacity to take the steps necessary to carry out Congress’s program, even if 
Congress itself had not provided for those specific steps”). 
 151 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971). 
 152 See, e.g., Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178, 183 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing to challenge the President’s actions); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043–44 (2d 
Cir. 1971) (upholding dismissal on political question grounds); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 
665–66 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (same). See generally Alfred W. Blumrosen & Steven M. Blumrosen, Re-
storing the Congressional Duty to Declare War, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 407, 483–500 (2011) (discuss-
ing the Vietnam-era presidential authority cases). 
 153 Laird, 451 F.2d at 30–31. The court, to be clear, was quite frank about its intermingling of 
merits-based and justiciability-based issues. See id. at 31 (noting that, in order to determine whether 
the dispute involved a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” of authority to a coordi-
nate constitutional branch, it needed to “identify the scope of the power which has been committed”); 
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ferently, the court somewhat confusingly reached the merits of a Youngstown-
type question in the course of explaining why it lacked the power to do what it 
had just done. 
More specifically, the First Circuit saw the case as presenting “a situation 
of shared powers, the executive acting and the Congress silent,” that thus im-
plicated Justice Jackson’s middle category.154 And within that middle category, 
the court found it significant that Congress had chosen to continue appropriat-
ing money to the Department of Defense while fully aware of the Depart-
ment’s engagement in the Vietnam conflict.155 These appropriations statutes, to 
be clear, were not necessarily “equivalent” to a declaration of war, or even to 
“express or implied ratification” of that war, but they still managed to demon-
strate “Congressional support of executive activities.”156 And given this 
“steady Congressional support,” the court was willing to conclude that “the 
Constitution has not been breached.”157 Thus, much as in Dames & Moore, a 
collection of congressional statutes of only indirect relevance to the question at 
hand sufficed to show that Congress stood behind the President’s own initia-
tives—enough so, at least, to justify the action as an apparently valid (though 
ultimately unreviewable) Category-Two measure. 
Another example of this sort of “general tenor” analysis comes from a re-
cent district court decision in Indigenous Environmental Network v. Trump, a 
case involving the Keystone XL pipeline.158 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the 
issuance of permits to construct a cross-border segment of the pipeline, argu-
ing, among other things, that then-President Donald Trump lacked the authori-
ty to grant those permits on his own.159 Having recited the Youngstown frame-
work, the court acknowledged a general lack of precedent on “the question of 
whether the President possesses the inherent authority to permit cross-border 
pipelines.”160 But in considering the question for itself, the court placed weight 
on two congressional actions that, in its view, showed a “tug and pull between 
Congress and the Executive branch when it comes to authority over cross-
border pipelines.”161 First, in 2011, Congress had passed a statute requiring the 
                                                                                                                           
see also id. at 33–34 (“[W]e are aware that while we have addressed the problem of justiciability in 
the light of the textual commitment criterion, we have also addressed the merits of the constitutional 
issue. We think, however, that this is inherent when the constitutional issue is posed in terms of scope 
of authority.”). 
 154 Id. at 34. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 428 F. Supp. 3d 296 (D. Mont. 2019). 
 159 Id. at 308. 
 160 Id.at 310–11. 
 161 Id. at 311. 
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President and the State Department to issue a permitting decision regarding the 
pipeline within sixty days.162 And second, in 2015, “Congress attempted to 
assert additional authority” by attempting to pass the Keystone XL Pipeline 
Approval Act, which would have authorized construction of the pipeline on 
Congress’s terms, had it not been vetoed by Trump’s predecessor, President 
Barack Obama.163 These enactments, coupled with President Obama’s 
pushback, had helped to reify a form of “presidential-congressional interplay” 
that President Trump had problematically chosen to “ignore[].”164 Thus, the 
court concluded, the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the President’s actions 
were “ultra vires, or outside the bounds of his legal authority.”165 
D. “Inherent Powers” Analysis 
A fourth method of Category-Two engagement eschews context-specific 
analyses of the relevant legislative materials in favor of more abstract musings 
about the nature of presidential power. Courts applying this approach have re-
solved zone-of-twilight questions by scrutinizing the connection between the 
presidential action under review and the “inherent powers” enjoyed by the 
President under Article II.166 
Then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh offered a Category-Two analysis along 
these lines in an opinion concurring in the D.C. Circuit’s denial of rehearing en 
                                                                                                                           
 162 Id. at 302. Following enactment of this statute, the Obama administration promptly denied the 
permit application. Id. 
 163 Id. at 311. 
 164 Id. at 311–12. 
 165 Id. at 312. 
 166 Although it was not technically a “Category-Two” decision, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit’s opinion in Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Rumsfeld employed a form of “in-
herent powers” analysis that in some ways proceeded along similar lines. See 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 
2003) (holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). Specifically, in 
considering whether the President could permissibly detain a U.S. citizen captured on U.S. soil as an 
“enemy combatant,” the court first took pains to explain why the President lacked the “inherent au-
thority” to do so unilaterally. Id. at 699–701, 712. And, having answered that question in the negative, 
the court then concluded that “express congressional authorization” was necessary to validate the 
action under review. Id. at 715 (“The Constitution’s explicit grant of the powers authorized in the 
Offenses Clause, the Suspension Clause, and the Third Amendment, to Congress is a powerful indica-
tion that, absent express congressional authorization, the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers do 
not support Padilla’s confinement.”). From there, however, the Court went on to conclude that, far 
from authorizing such detentions, Congress had flatly forbidden them, by means of the 1971 Non-
Detention Act. Id. at 718–19. That “congressional ‘denial of authority’” thus placed the President in 
“Youngstown’s third category,” within which the detention obviously could not withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny. Id. at 712. In other words, by considering the necessity of congressional authorization 
prior to evaluating its presence, the court managed to suggest that the President’s actions would have 
been invalid within the zone of twilight, while ultimately holding that the President’s actions were in 
fact prohibited under Category Three. 
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banc in Al-Bihani v. Obama.167 The en banc petition in that case raised the 
question of whether the Charming Betsy canon—which provides for the reso-
lution of statutory ambiguities so as to avoid violations of international law—
should govern courts’ interpretation of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force (AUMF).168 The court denied the rehearing petition on the 
ground that the panel decision’s treatment of that issue was not necessary to 
the case’s outcome.169 But Judge Kavanaugh used the occasion to outline his 
own views on the matter, contending in a lengthy separate opinion that the 
Charming Betsy canon had no bearing on the AUMF’s meaning and that, in 
any event, the statute was best read to authorize certain actions that interna-
tional law itself purported to forbid.170 
Having maintained that the AUMF conferred Category-One status on the 
(allegedly international law-violating) executive action under review, Ka-
vanaugh then went on to offer an argument in the alternative: Even assuming 
the AUMF had “not authorize[d] the President to take actions that are prohibit-
ed by international law,” this would merely have meant that the challenged 
presidential actions fell “into Category Two of Justice Jackson’s Youngstown 
framework, not Category Three.”171 And that fact mattered greatly, because, as 
Judge Kavanaugh went on to contend, “[t]he proper Category Two analysis in 
these circumstances supports the President.”172 Why? Because 
when the President acts extraterritorially against non-U.S. citizens in 
self-defense of the Nation, especially in support of a war effort that 
Congress has authorized . . . the President possesses broad authority 
under Article II, as Chief Executive of the Nation and Commander 
in Chief of the Armed Forces, that does not depend on specific con-
gressional authorization.173  
In other words, it “would make little difference whether the AUMF incorpo-
rates international-law norms as a limit on the scope of the President’s statuto-
                                                                                                                           
 167 See 619 F.3d 1, 9–53 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
 168 Id. at 9–10. 
 169 Id. at 1 (Sentelle, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). 
 170 Id. at 37 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“[W]hen Congress has 
broadly authorized the President to take certain actions, and that broad authorization encompasses 
actions that might in turn violate international law, courts have no legitimate basis to invoke interna-
tional law as a ground for second-guessing the President’s interpretation.”). 
 171 Id. at 49. In other words, the AUMF’s failure to authorize violations of international law 
would have constituted a form of congressional silence on the question. If, by contrast, the AUMF had 
specifically prohibited the President from violating international law, then the court would have found 
itself in “a Category Three situation.” Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 50. 
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ry authorization, because Article II would still independently authorize the 
President’s action.”174 Thus, to the extent that the challenged presidential ac-
tion implicated Justice Jackson’s zone of twilight, its constitutional validity 
was readily demonstrated by that action’s close connection to core Article II 
responsibilities.175 
A similar form of “inherent powers” analysis was at least hinted at in a 
recent dissenting opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces.176 United States v. Jones raised the question of whether the 
President had the authority to designate certain forms of conduct prohibited by 
the “catch-all” provision of Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice (UCMJ) as “lesser included offenses” of other specific offenses defined 
elsewhere in the UCMJ.177 The majority said no, emphasizing that Congress 
and only Congress had the authority to define criminal offenses, including 
within the UCMJ.178 But Judge Baker, in dissent, understood the issue in a 
somewhat different light. Although Article 134 by its own terms did not au-
thorize the President to delineate offenses and/or lesser-included offenses, nei-
ther did the provision prohibit the President from doing so.179 Thus, as far as 
Article 134 offenses were concerned, “the President acts in the gray zone of 
Category II.”180 
How, then, to resolve the Category-Two issue? Some of Judge Baker’s 
analysis incorporated acquiescence-based reasoning—in particular, he placed 
emphasis on the fact that the President had “exercised this authority for sixty 
years,” throughout which time Congress had “tolerated and acquiesced to such 
a practice.”181 But other portions of the analysis placed weight on the Presi-
dent’s Article II status as Commander in Chief of the armed forces.182 There 
were, in short, key “constitutional distinctions between civilian law and prac-
tice and military law and practice,” owing to “the President’s independent au-
                                                                                                                           
 174 Id. at 52. 
 175 See Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204, 226–27 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding, “[i]n the ab-
sence of a statutory mandate or express prohibition,” an executive-branch decision to revoke a Vice 
Consul’s naturalization authority because it involved “a seemingly delicate foreign affairs matter” and 
was “based on policy considerations traditionally, although not exclusively, associated with the execu-
tive branch”). 
 176 United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465, 473–79 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (Baker, J., dissenting). 
 177 Id. at 472. Article 134 is a sort of catch-all provision, which covers, among other things, “all 
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline” and “all conduct of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces.” 10 U.S.C. § 934. 
 178 Jones, 68 M.J. at 471 (majority opinion).  
 179 Id. at 476 (Baker, J., dissenting). 
 180 Id. at 478. 
 181 Id. at 474, 477. 
 182 See, e.g., id. at 475–77. 
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thority as commander in chief.”183 If nothing else, that role gave the President 
“some measure of authority to maintain good order and discipline within the 
military,” which had to be counterbalanced against Congress’s own Article I 
power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
Naval Forces.”184 All told, the fact that “[m]ilitary discipline is an area of con-
current authority between Congress and the President” bore special signifi-
cance when considering the longstanding history of congressional acquies-
cence to the President’s role “in clarifying the meaning of Article 134.”185 And 
those facts together should have supported the conclusion that the President’s 
actions passed muster under Category Two.186 
Consider finally the First Circuit’s Category-Two analysis in Chas. T. 
Main International, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, yet another 
dispute arising from the Iran claims suspension order.187 There, the First Cir-
cuit chose to “approach the President’s order in terms of whether he had inher-
ent power under the Constitution to take such action.”188 Having framed the 
question in these terms, the court went on to reference past examples of execu-
tive agreements involving the suspension of claims,189 along with prior Su-
preme Court decisions treating this “settlement power” as “incidental to the 
President’s position as the nation’s representative in the arena of international 
affairs.”190 And with a nod to Justice Jackson’s suggestion that Category-Two 
cases should “depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary impon-
derables rather than on abstract theories of law,” the court cited to the “impera-
tive need to preserve a presidential flexibility sufficient to diffuse an interna-
tional crisis, in order to prevent the crisis from escalating or even leading to 
                                                                                                                           
 183 Id. at 474. 
 184 Id. at 471 (majority opinion); id. at 477 (Baker, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8). 
 185 Id. at 477 (Baker, J., dissenting). 
 186 Id. The President’s foreign affairs power was also emphasized in a decision from a California 
appeals court, which held that a state-law method of tax apportionment was invalid because it was 
preempted by federal policy regarding international trade and taxation. See Barclays Bank Int’l Ltd. v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 626, 627 (Ct. App. 1990), rev’d, 829 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1992) (en 
banc). That policy, which derived from an order of the President, was challenged by the state as fall-
ing outside the scope of the President’s executive power. Id. at 642. In evaluating this claim, the court 
conceded that “the executive action here aligns with Justice Jackson’s second category.” Id. at 643. 
But the court went on to hold that policy implicated the “field” of “foreign policy . . . in which the 
executive possesses substantial power of its own.” Id. The order, in short, involved “a critical foreign 
policy issue on which the executive has affirmatively acted and the Congress has not,” and that was 
enough to sustain it against a separation-of-powers attack. Id. at 644–45. 
 187 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 188 Id. at 810. 
 189 Id. at 811. 
 190 Id. at 811–13 (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)). 
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war.”191 In the First Circuit’s view, “the President ha[d] acted to resolve what 
was indisputably a major crisis in the foreign relations of this country,” and his 
suspension order—at least as applied to the plaintiffs before the court—was “a 
necessary incident to the resolution of a dispute between our nation and anoth-
er.”192 That was enough to show that “the executive power extends so far as to 
permit the accord reached here.”193 
III. TWILIGHT-ZONE AVOIDANCE 
As the discussion thus far should illustrate, judicial engagement with the 
zone of twilight happens only infrequently. In and of itself, this conclusion might 
seem unremarkable. Historically speaking, direct challenges to presidential ac-
tion have been relatively uncommon, thus restricting the overall number of cases 
in which the Justice Jackson framework might plausibly apply. 194 In addition, in 
our present-day “age of statutes,”195 within which administrative agencies as-
sume significant responsibilities in implementing federal law,196 many would-be 
constitutional challenges to presidential authority instead ended up taking the 
                                                                                                                           
 191 Id. at 812–13 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 192 Id. at 814. 
 193 Id. A 1970 U.S. district court decision arguably offers another example of inherent powers 
analysis within the context of a Category-Two inquiry. In Narenji v. Civiletti, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia held unlawful a Justice Department regulation—issued at the behest of 
the President—that required Iranian student-visa holders to report to INS offices for immediate exam-
ination of their immigration status. 481 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C.), rev’d, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
Somewhat puzzlingly, although the court found that the regulation violated the students’ Fifth 
Amendment rights, it still went out of its way to explain why the President had not breached separa-
tion-of-powers requirements by acting in this way. Specifically, the court noted “that there has not 
been what could be quantified as an express or implied Congressional authorization or denunciation of 
executive actions like those taken by the defendants here,” which in turn meant that “Justice Jackson’s 
‘zone of twilight’ must be the focus of the Court’s consideration.” Id. at 1142–43. And, the court went 
on to suggest, there was good reason to think that “the ‘imperative of events and contemporary im-
ponderables,’ as well as certain constitutional precepts, lend more than a modicum of support to de-
fendants’ assertions of authority.” Id. at 1143 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637). The President 
had pursued the challenged action in connection with ongoing efforts to negotiate an end to the hos-
tage crisis in Iran, and his efforts thus reflected the President’s “awesome responsibility for protecting 
our national interest in seeing that the inviolability of this nation’s diplomatic missions is respected.” 
Id. But all of that, the court concluded, was ultimately a moot point, given that the regulation abridged 
the Fifth Amendment and given that the President lacked the authority to violate constitutional rights. 
Id. In other words, the question of whether the President had the constitutional power to act unilateral-
ly was rendered moot by the fact that the President’s actions ran afoul of a separately conferred rights-
based limit. 
 194 See Manheim & Watts, supra note 24, at 1770–72. 
 195 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
 196 See, e.g., Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law,” 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1597–98 
(2012) (charting the post-New Deal growth of the administrative state).  
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form of statutory challenges to agency authority—challenges that are generally 
subject to a different set of procedural and substantive rules.197 
But even if these and other factors are at least partially responsible for the 
relative scarcity of Category-Two opinions, we think that the doctrinal amor-
phousness of the twilight zone itself has also played a causal role. The primary 
basis for this supposition has as much to do with the existing universe of opin-
ions that engage with the zone of twilight as it does to an adjacent category of 
opinions that manage to avoid entering its territory at all. More specifically, we 
have located several opinions addressing presidential actions that appear ripe 
for Category-Two analysis and yet manage not to say anything about the twi-
light zone’s scope or substance. We cannot, of course, enter the minds of the 
judges that rendered these opinions, and we cannot therefore know the extent 
to which the twilight zone’s amorphousness might have induced them to stay 
away from it.198 But the cases provide strong circumstantial evidence that the 
lack of meaningful guidance for twilight-zone cases bears at least some of the 
responsibility for the middle category’s relative desuetude. 
As this Part helps to show, twilight-zone avoidance can proceed in at least 
three different ways.199 First, a court might strategically construe an arguably 
                                                                                                                           
 197 See Manheim & Watts, supra note 24, at 1748 (noting that, “until recently, [the] absence of a 
well-developed framework to guide judicial review of presidential orders did not prove particularly 
problematic” given that “litigants tended to wait to challenge agency action rather than the presidential 
orders themselves”). 
 198 Perhaps the most direct acknowledgment of a judge’s desire to avoid the middle category 
comes from Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Medellín v. Texas. See 552 U.S. 491, 564–66 
(2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In contrast to the majority, Justice Breyer would have found that the 
relevant treaty obligations were self-executing and thus required Texas to reopen the judgment at issue 
in the case. Id. at 541–63. But he declined to consider in the alternative whether, in the face of a non-
self-executing treaty, the President’s memorandum requiring adherence to the ICJ judgment could 
have validly bound Texas to do the same. Id. at 566. In that case, Breyer explained, the President’s 
exercise of power would fall within “that middle range of Presidential authority where Congress has 
neither specifically authorized nor specifically forbidden the Presidential action in question.” Id. at 
564. But, in lieu of “the Court’s comparative lack of expertise in foreign affairs,” “the importance of 
the Nation’s foreign relations,” “the difficulty of finding the proper constitutional balance among state 
and federal, executive and legislative, powers in such matters,” and “the likely future importance of 
this Court’s efforts to do so,” Justice Breyer was inclined to “very much hesitate before concluding 
that the Constitution implicitly sets forth broad prohibitions (or permissions) in this area.” Id. at 565–
66. Thus, rather than reach a conclusion about the validity of the memorandum itself, Justice Breyer 
chose to “leave the matter in the constitutional shade from which it has emerged.” Id. at 566. 
 199 In outlining these three methods of twilight-zone avoidance, we do not mean to present an 
exhaustive taxonomy. Other methods may sometimes be available. To offer just one additional exam-
ple, courts might also sidestep difficult twilight-zone questions by relying on alternative opinions 
from Youngstown itself—most notably Justice Black’s majority opinion—in cases that involve con-
gressional silence. 
 Such a move was arguably reflected in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania’s decision in United States v. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774 (W.D. Pa. 2014). Juarez-
Escobar concerned President Obama’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Perma-
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silent statutory framework in a manner that divines sufficient congressional 
will to nudge the challenged presidential action into either Category One or 
Three of the Youngstown framework.200 Second, the court might rely on prece-
dent-based shortcuts to sidestep both the explicit recognition of a Category-
Two action and an active engagement with open-ended, context-sensitive anal-
ysis that Justice Jackson’s framework prescribes.201 Finally, courts can avoid 
the middle category by altogether forgoing a judgment on the merits, relying 
instead on justiciability-based grounds for dismissal.202 
A. Strategic Category Assignments 
Applying the Jackson framework begins with statutory interpretation. A 
judge enters the twilight zone by finding that Congress has neither authorized 
nor denied the presidential act in question—in other words, that Congress is 
silent. As a result, the most obvious means by which courts can avoid the twi-
light zone is by finding that Congress has in fact expressed its legislative will. 
There are, to be sure, many cases in which readily identifiable statutory lan-
guage unambiguously lends itself to an articulation of congressional will.203 
But there are also many cases in which that is not the case. And when that lat-
ter type of case arises, judges seeking to avoid the zone of twilight will still 
sometimes strain to make the statutory backdrop speak.204 
                                                                                                                           
nent Residents (DAPA) program, which allowed for the granting of deferred-action status to eligible 
undocumented parents of children with U.S. citizenship. Id. at 786. Concluding that DAPA exceeded 
constitutional separation-of-powers requirements, the district court made short shrift of the argument 
that “Congressional inaction” with respect to DAPA recipients furnished a sufficient justification for 
DAPA itself. Id. at 785–86. In so doing, however, the court said nothing about Category Two or the 
Justice Jackson framework more generally. Instead, relying heavily on Justice Black’s Youngstown 
opinion, the District Court characterized DAPA as an act of “lawmaking power” that “effectively 
change[d] the United States’ immigration policy.” Id. at 786. An acknowledged instance of congres-
sional silence thus failed to implicate the middle category because the district court chose to analyze 
the case through the lens of a different Youngstown opinion. And under that framework, the court 
concluded, DAPA’s invalidity stemmed from the simple fact that it looked too much like an exercise 
of “lawmaking power.” Id. (noting that that “[t]his Executive Action ‘cross[ed] the line’” because it 
constituted “legislation”). 
 200 See infra Part III.A. 
 201 See infra Part III.B. 
 202 See infra Part III.C. 
 203 See, for example, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, where the Court was presented with a 
statute that sought “to override the [executive action] by allowing citizens born in Jerusalem to list 
their place of birth as ‘Israel.’” 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2082 (2015).  
 204 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, The Supreme Court 2005 Term—Comment, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 99 (2006) (noting that, when 
applying the Youngstown framework, a court “can toggle between categories depending on its stingi-
ness or generosity with any given statute and how it reads legislative silence”); Adrian Vermeule, Our 
Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1141–42 (2009) (“In a world of multiple 
and very vague statutory delegations bearing on national security, foreign relations, and emergency 
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Consider, for instance, then-Judge Alex Kozinski’s dissent from a denial 
of rehearing en banc in Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer.205 A Ninth 
Circuit panel had preliminarily enjoined enforcement of an Arizona policy that 
would have refused driver’s licenses to individuals participating in the federal 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA).206 The panel had 
avoided an explicit assessment of DACA’s constitutionality and instead charac-
terizing the Arizona policy as generally incompatible with existing delegations 
of immigration-related powers to the President.207 But Judge Kozinski disa-
greed with this conclusion, contending that the panel’s conclusion on this point 
“finds no support in the actual text of the [Immigration and Nationality Act],” 
a statute that did not effectuate any delegation of authority to the President to 
implement a DACA-like program.208 Intuitively, such a conclusion would have 
seemed to support the idea that DACA amounted to a form of twilight-zone 
action and the focus would naturally have turned to whether the President 
could still pursue the policy in the absence of congressional authorization. But 
that is not where Judge Kozinski went. In his eyes, the zone of twilight was 
inapplicable because Congress had “repeatedly declined to act” to endorse 
DACA, as evidenced by Congress’s failure to pass a statute that would have 
authorized it.209 Thus, by not authorizing presidential action, Kozinski main-
tained, Congress had effectively signaled its disapproval of that action.210 And 
it had thereby placed the President’s power at its “lowest ebb.”211 
Another Ninth Circuit opinion, City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 
reflects a similar statutory move.212 This case concerned a challenge to Presi-
dent Trump’s “‘sanctuary’ cities” order, which directed the withholding of fed-
eral financial assistance to jurisdictions that refused cooperation with federal 
efforts to detain and deport undocumented immigrants.213 The Ninth Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
powers, judges have a great deal of freedom—not infinite freedom, of course—to assign Youngstown 
categories to support the decisions they want to reach, rather than reach decisions based on the 
Youngstown categories.”). 
 205 855 F.3d 957, 957 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
 206 Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 818 F.3d 901, 963 (9th Cir. 2016), amended and supersed-
ed, 855 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 207 Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957, 966–68 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 208 Id. at 961 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 209 Id. at 962 n.7 (“We are not in the ‘zone of twilight,’ where the distribution of presidential and 
congressional power is uncertain. Congress has repeatedly declined to act—refusing time and time 
again to pass the DREAM Act—so the President is flying solo.” (citation omitted) (citing Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))). 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. at 962. 
 212 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 213 Id. at 1231. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“Enhancing Pub-
lic Safety in the Interior of the United States”). 
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identified the case as one raising separation-of-powers issues and specifically 
endorsed the Jackson framework as the “operative test.”214 After quoting Jus-
tice Jackson for the proposition that presidential power is at its “lowest ebb” 
when reflecting action “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress,” the court then held that the non-exercise of congressional power 
was itself sufficient to locate the President’s executive order within Justice 
Jackson’s third category.215 Specifically, “because Congress has the exclusive 
power to spend and has not delegated authority to the Executive to condition 
new grants [as set out in the challenged executive order] the President’s ‘power 
is at its lowest ebb.’”216 In other words, Congress’s non-utilization of an enu-
merated power demonstrated not mere congressional silence, but active con-
gressional disapproval.217 
This argument, of course, can go the other way as well: just as the ab-
sence of specifically on-point legislation might evince a sufficient degree of 
congressional disapproval as to implicate Category Three, so too might it sig-
nal a sufficient degree of approval to push in favor of Category One. For ex-
ample, United States v. Groos, a 2008 decision from the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois, involved an individual facing charges for vio-
lating Export Administration Regulations (EAR) that had been promulgated 
under authority granted by Congress through the Export Administration Act 
(EAA).218 The EAA, however, had lapsed under a statutory sunset provision at 
the time of the defendant’s acts.219 In the face of the lapsed statute, President 
George W. Bush issued an executive order that purported to extend the Presi-
dent’s export control authority and the EAR specifically, pursuant to the IEE-
PA.220 Consistent with IEEPA’s requirement for a presidential declaration of 
emergency, President Bush’s executive order included a determination that the 
lapsing of the EAA—i.e., an action caused by Congress’s inaction—had “con-
stitute[ed] an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, and economy of the United States.”221 In short, “the President, by Ex-
ecutive Order, continued export controls enacted under the EAA by ordering 
                                                                                                                           
 214 City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d at 1233. 
 215 Id. at 1233–34 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637–38). 
 216 Id. (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637). 
 217 See id. at 1234 & n.4 (stating that “Congress has frequently considered and thus far rejected 
legislation accomplishing the goals of the Executive Order” and citing several failed pieces of legisla-
tion with restrictions similar to those enshrined in the challenged EO). 
 218 616 F. Supp. 2d 777, 780 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 219 Id. at 784. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,222, 66 Fed. Reg. 44,025 (Aug. 17, 2001)). 
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them ‘carried out’ under the IEEPA, and explicitly extended the EAR as 
though issued under the IEEPA.”222 
But did the President have the constitutional authority to do this? The 
District Court began its analysis of this question by acknowledging that “[t]he 
enforcement of regulations in the absence of an authorizing statute is trou-
bling”223 and that existing doctrine made clear that regulations promulgated 
pursuant to a statute do not extend beyond the lifetime of that statute.224 Never-
theless, the court concluded that the EAR remained valid in light of two im-
portant facts. First, the court emphasized the relevance of congressional inac-
tion. Congress had been “aware that the President invoke[d] the IEEPA to stop-
gap the EAA, yet it ha[d] never acted to change the language of the EAA or the 
IEEPA to bar such behavior.”225 In other words, Congress’s failure to stop the 
President was suggestive that the President’s actions were in fact consistent 
with congressional will.226 Second, although “[t]he IEEPA d[i]d not expressly 
grant the President the authority to continue EAA or EAR in times of emer-
gency,” the statute did “empower the President to act in furtherance of broad 
national security goals.”227 Thus, faced with an executive action that: (a) fell 
outside the sunset period of a specific statutory authorization; and (b) bore an 
uncertain relationship to a more general statutory authorization, the court de-
cided to resolve these decidedly mixed statutory signals in the President’s fa-
vor, channeling its analysis into Category One rather than Category Two (or 
even, perhaps, Category Three).228 
The above-discussed opinions all reveal an irony: in their efforts to avoid 
invoking Justice Jackson’s zone of twilight, the opinions all utilized tools, in-
ferences, and arguments that could just as easily have been deployed within the 
twilight zone itself. Thus, for instance, rather than cite to Congress’s failure to 
authorize DACA as equivalent to a statutory prohibition on DACA, Judge 
Kozinski in Brewer might instead have simply acknowledged Congress’s si-
lence with respect to DACA and then—within Category Two—pointed to 
Congress’s unsuccessful efforts to ratify the program as reflective of a “general 
                                                                                                                           
 222 Id. at 785. 
 223 Id. This seems to put it mildly. 
 224 Id. at 786–87. 
 225 Id. at 785. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. at 788. Specifically, the court noted that the IEEPA “explicitly delegates authority to regu-
late exports, issue regulations, and impose criminal penalties, all of which are similar to provisions in 
the lapsed EAA.” Id. 
 228 Id. Contra, e.g., Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of Com., 613 F.3d 1147, 1153–54 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (hold-
ing that President Bush’s executive order failed to effectively extend EAA provisions enabling juris-
diction to challenge Department of Commerce sanctions).  
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tenor” of congressional nonacceptance.229 So too in City & County of San 
Francisco: rather than point to Congress’s “exclusive” power over federal 
spending as indicative of Congress’s non-approval of President Trump’s sanc-
tuary cities order, the Ninth Circuit might instead have simply acknowledged 
an absence of clear statutory guidance one way or the other and then—within 
Category Two—have explained why Congress’s constitutional primacy with 
respect to federal spending decisions (and the President’s corresponding lack 
of inherent authority with respect to those decisions) militated strongly against 
upholding the President’s withholding of funding to “sanctuary cities.” And so 
too in Gross: rather than fall back on the IEEPA’s general tendency to favor the 
President’s achievement of “broad national security goals” as somehow man-
aging to preserve a statutory authority that Congress had explicitly let lapse, 
the court might instead have simply concluded that the President had moved 
from Category One to Category Two but that—again, within Category Two 
itself—the IEEPA and Article II still provided ample reason for letting the 
President move forward. There was, in other words, no shortage of twilight-
zone tools that the judges deciding these cases could have chosen to utilize. 
But, perhaps owing to the overall uncertainty and opaqueness of the doctrine 
they confronted, these judges instead ended up trying to fit square pegs into 
round holes—finding creative ways to insist that Congress had spoken when 
the legislative backdrop more plausibly signaled silence instead. 
B. Precedent-Based Shortcuts 
A second potential method of twilight-zone avoidance relies on the use of 
what we call “precedent-based shortcuts.” When a court confronts presidential 
action undertaken in the face of congressional silence, that court might cir-
cumvent direct application of Justice Jackson’s framework by citing to prior, 
on-point precedents that on their own suffice to dispose of the issue at hand.230 
If the challenged action sufficiently mirrors (or sufficiently contrasts with) a 
prior presidential action that the court has already declared valid, then the court 
need not engage directly with the tripartite framework, much less its middle 
                                                                                                                           
 229 See supra Part II.C. In this context, to be sure, Judge Kozinski would still have needed to 
explain why Congress’s repeated failure to act at all in the face of DACA was not in fact reflective of 
congressional acquiescence to what the President had done. Kozinski’s claim, in other words, would 
have been a “general tenor”-type argument that drew a line from Congress’s refusal to authorize 
DACA to a conclusion that Congress was resistant to DACA. But one might alternatively have argued 
that by failing to prohibit a challenged form of Presidential action (in this case DACA), Congress had 
simply acquiesced to it, as, for instance, lower courts had held in the Barquero and American Interna-
tional Group cases. See Part II.B supra.  
 230 See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text (characterizing the Supreme Court’s resolution 
of Dames & Moore and Garamendi as examples of this phenomenon). 
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category. Rather, it can validate (or invalidate) the action by reference to the 
on-point precedential instruction while leaving unmentioned the precedent’s 
own twilight-zone credentials. 
Suppose, hypothetically, that in an earlier Case A, a court conducted an 
exhaustive twilight-zone analysis that resulted in the conclusion that presiden-
tial Action A passed constitutional muster. And suppose that the court now con-
fronts in Case B a new form of presidential action, Action B, about which Con-
gress has provided no legislative guidance. In deciding Case B, the Court 
might choose to evaluate Action B in much the same way that it had evaluated 
Action A—namely, by reciting Justice Jackson’s framework, assigning Action B 
to the middle category, and then working through the twilight zone’s “contem-
porary imponderables” in arriving at the bottom-line constitutional conclusion. 
But if the two actions are sufficiently similar to one another, the court can in-
stead simply declare that Action B is in all material respects analogous to Ac-
tion A and, without ever mentioning the twilight zone at all, rely on the au-
thority of Case A to dictate the result. 
To be clear, there is nothing necessarily manipulative or untoward about 
this sort of doctrinal move. If the prior, post-Youngstown precedent on its own 
suffices to dictate the resolution of a present-day case, recourse back to the 
Youngstown framework would amount to an unnecessary waste of time. But 
one can see in this maneuver the seeds of another potential method of twilight-
zone avoidance. Specifically, if a reviewing court strives to avoid a direct en-
counter with the zone of twilight, it might strain to construe a prior, middle-
category precedent more broadly than that precedent itself would justify. In so 
doing, the Court would at least arguably be departing from the methodological 
spirit of the Justice Jackson framework. If faithful application of the frame-
work requires a fact-sensitive and case-specific investigation of twilight-zone 
action, then any attempt to “rulify” the framework through broad and categori-
cal readings of prior decisions would reflect a departure from the analysis that 
the framework prescribes.231 Courts can “avoid” the zone of twilight by treat-
ing as settled an actually unsettled question of law. 
Obviously, the extent to which this maneuver reflects a clear-cut example 
of twilight-zone avoidance will often lie in the eye of the beholder. A genuine 
act of avoidance occurs only to the extent that the present-day decision over-
extends the precedent on which it relies. If, by contrast, the prior precedent 
really does cover the new case at hand, then it becomes much harder to main-
tain that the reviewing court is doing anything other than faithfully applying 
the law. Put differently, a court does not engage in avoidance simply by fol-
                                                                                                                           
 231 See Coenen, supra note 111, at 661 (defining “rulification” as the process whereby subsequent 
judicial glosses on a legal standard “materially increase[] the specificity of a controlling legal norm”). 
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lowing the clear instructions that a binding precedent tells it to follow; the 
avoidance occurs only when the court manages to stretch the import of a prec-
edent to cover a fact-pattern to which that precedent might not have originally 
applied. Distinguishing instances of the former from instances of the latter is 
not always easy to do. 
With that caveat in mind, however, we still think it is at least arguable that 
“precedent-based” avoidance of the twilight zone has emerged in connection 
with at least one category of executive-power cases—namely, those involving 
sole executive agreements involving the settlement of claims.232 The story here 
begins with Dames & Moore v. Regan, which, as we have already seen, fea-
tured an extensive twilight-zone analysis of an executive action undertaken 
pursuant to a sole executive agreement.233 Consistent with Justice Jackson’s 
own description of the twilight zone’s doctrinal criteria, the Court took pains to 
“[]emphasize the narrowness” of its holding, highlighting its fact-specific na-
ture and expressly declining to hold “that the President possesses plenary pow-
er to settle claims.”234 But by the time the Court decided American Insurance 
Association v. Garamendi, that “cautious approach” to the zone-of-twilight 
analysis had been, as Brannon Denning and Michael Ramsey have put it, “cas-
ually swept away.”235 There, the Court cited to Dames & Moore—along with 
two other pre-Youngstown cases—as standing for the broad proposition “that 
the President has authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with other coun-
tries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress,” includ-
ing “executive agreements to settle claims of American nationals against for-
eign governments.”236 Thus, Garamendi treated what had in fact been a narrow 
and fact-specific twilight-zone analysis of one particular sole executive 
agreement as yielding a categorical rule that supported the validity of a wide 
                                                                                                                           
 232 Although we focus on this form of twilight-zone avoidance as it relates to sole executive 
agreements, the method is not substantively limited. This type of avoidance is perhaps the most diffi-
cult form to identify, as courts can effectuate it with subtlety and without any invocation of Youngs-
town or the Justice Jackson framework at all. 
 233 See supra Part I.B.i. 
 234 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981). 
 235 See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 84, at 921. 
 236 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 
679, 682–83). To be sure, the Court in Garamendi also cited to two pre-Youngstown cases—United 
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223 (1942), and United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330–31 
(1937)—as further supporting the existence of a broad claims-settlement authority. But, as Denning 
and Ramsey note, although the Court “in some places worded its decisions [in Belmont and Pink] 
quite broadly,” it also took care to “emphasiz[e] the specific context of the agreement” under review. 
Denning & Ramsey, supra note 84, at 919. Those decisions, together with Dames & Moore, “had not 
established a general theory of executive agreements, but rather had identified specific instances in 
which they might be used, without explaining their outer boundaries.” Id. at 920. 
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range of such agreements.237 And in so doing, it gave lower courts an easy op-
portunity to circumvent Justice Jackson’s middle category in future executive-
agreement cases. 
And, indeed, several lower courts have seized on this opportunity, treating 
Garamendi as establishing that, when Congress is silent, the President has ro-
bust authority to act pursuant to agreements with other nations. For instance, in 
Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the D.C. Circuit cited to Garamendi for the 
proposition that “[t]he authority of the President to settle claims of foreign na-
tionals through executive agreements is clear.”238 Similarly, in La Réunion 
Aérienne v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jarmahiriya, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia rejected the plaintiff’s contention that Presi-
dent George W. Bush lacked the authority to enter into a claims-settlement 
agreement with Libya, citing to both Garamendi and Dames & Moore as es-
tablishing the validity of the President’s “power to settle such claims without 
explicit congressional authorization.”239 In Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH & 
Co. KG, the Second Circuit characterized Garamendi and Dames & Moore as 
together establishing that “[t]he President’s power to settle claims through . . . 
executive agreements” with foreign nations “has long been recognized by 
courts . . . and acquiesced to by Congress.”240 Notably, none of these opinions 
included even a citation to Justice Jackson’s concurrence, let alone any other 
opinion from the Youngstown decision. Far from wrestling with the “contem-
porary imponderables” of the twilight zone, then, these and other opinions 
could render a swift, affirmative constitutional judgment on a form of middle 
category presidential action by relying on a simple and categorical rule. 
Again, the point of this discussion is not to cast doubt on the validity or 
soundness of the idea that the President has authority to pursue a wide range of 
sole executive agreements against a backdrop of legislative silence. That is, in 
effect, what Garamendi said, and lower courts should hardly be faulted for 
following Garamendi’s lead. Rather, our point is simply to suggest that, 
whether intentionally or not, the Court in Garamendi both engaged in and ena-
bled another form of twilight-zone avoidance by endorsing a “rulified” gloss 
on Dames & Moore’s more tentative and fact-specific holding. The upshot of 
the decision was to take a set of presidential actions that satisfy all the trigger-
ing criteria of Justice Jackson’s middle category—i.e., claims-settlement 
                                                                                                                           
 237 Denning & Ramsey, supra note 84, at 831 (noting that Garamendi “contains broad and unre-
flective language endorsing executive agreements”). 
 238 333 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396). 
 239 867 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32 (D.D.C. 2011); id. at 33 (first citing Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415; and 
then citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 679–83). 
 240 431 F.3d 57, 72 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (first citing Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415; 
and then citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680–82). 
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agreements that Congress has neither approved nor prohibited—and to treat 
them as presumptively valid. With that presumption on the books, there exists 
little need for twilight-zone analysis in future claims-settlement cases. 
C. Justiciability-Based Dismissals 
A final method of twilight-zone avoidance proceeds by circumventing the 
merits of presidential-power questions. More specifically, this avoidance tech-
nique relies on justiciability doctrines as the basis for dismissing presidential 
power disputes that might otherwise give rise to zone-of-twilight questions. 
At one level, this suggestion should hardly raise eyebrows. Across many 
different areas of doctrine—including but not limited to separation-of-powers 
doctrine—commentators have detailed how rules of Article III standing, the 
political question doctrine, and other judicial glosses on the “case or contro-
versy” requirement often enable judges to sidestep issues they would rather not 
decide.241 Our claim here, however, is stronger: in particular, we want to sug-
gest that twilight-zone cases are especially amenable to justiciability-based 
avoidance techniques, on the theory that a defining feature of the twilight 
zone—namely, the absence of congressional guidance regarding the appropri-
ateness of a challenged presidential action—can be and sometimes has been 
treated as the central reason for deeming a case nonjusticiable.242 
Perhaps the most suggestive opinion in this respect comes from Justice 
Powell’s concurrence in the judgment in Goldwater v. Carter.243 Goldwater 
concerned a constitutional challenge to President Carter’s unilateral termina-
tion of a defense treaty with Taiwan, predicated on the claim that the President 
lacked the authority to abrogate a duly ratified Article II treaty in the absence 
of congressional approval.244 On the merits, the question plausibly implicated 
Justice Jackson’s middle category: neither the treaty itself nor any other con-
gressional statute provided any instructions regarding the means of the treaty’s 
rescission.245 But the Court never reached the merits in Goldwater, as a majori-
                                                                                                                           
 241 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 115–27 (1962); see also Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United 
States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1410–18 (1999) (detailing judicial use (and 
non-use) of justiciability doctrines based on judges’ assessment of the “foreign relations effects” of 
deciding the case). 
 242 Cf. Eichensehr, supra note 62, at 620 (“Many of the separation-of-powers disputes to which 
the Youngstown framework applies do not end up before courts due to problems of standing or justici-
ability, among others.”). 
 243 444 U.S. 996, 996–97 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). 
 244 Id. at 997–98. 
 245 See, e.g., Catherine Amirfar & Ashika Singh, The Trump Administration and the “Unmaking” 
of International Agreements, 59 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 453–54 (2018) (noting that “[a]ny truly unilat-
eral termination in the absence of action by Congress necessarily resides in the Youngstown II ‘zone of 
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ty of Justices favored a disposition on justiciability-based grounds instead. 
Four of those Justices relied on the political question doctrine, reasoning that 
the question fell altogether outside the cognizance of Article III courts.246 But 
Justice Powell favored a more limited and contingent basis for dismissal. In-
voking prudential, ripeness-based limits, Justice Powell reasoned that the case 
was not fit for judicial resolution because Congress had not (yet) “taken action 
asserting its constitutional authority” with respect to the challenged treaty 
withdrawal.247 And because Congress had not yet acted, there existed no “actu-
al confrontation” between the political branches and the dispute merely pre-
sented “differences” that “turn[ed] on political rather than legal considera-
tions.”248 The better course, according to Powell, was simply for the Court to 
stay its hand, adhering to the general principle that “[t]he Judicial Branch 
should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the Presi-
dent and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional im-
passe.”249 Put another way, “[i]f the Congress chooses not to confront the Pres-
ident,” it was not the Court’s “task to do so.”250 
Notably, lower courts have sometimes cited to Justice Powell’s Goldwater 
opinion in defending their own decisions not to reach the merits of disputes 
that lacked an “actual confrontation” between the branches.251 For example, in 
Doe v. Bush, the plaintiffs sought an injunction against President George W. 
Bush’s initiation of military hostilities in Iraq, contending that the contemplat-
ed action conflicted with the force authorization statute that Congress had en-
                                                                                                                           
twilight’: the President takes independent action to terminate an international agreement, ‘in absence 
of either a congressional grant or denial of authority’” and characterizing Goldwater as presenting 
such a case (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring))). 
 246 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). Citing the political ques-
tion doctrine, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the Constitution was “silent” as to whether legislative 
involvement in the abrogation of an Article II treaty was required and that such silence indicated that 
the issue would “surely be controlled by political standards.” Id. at 1003 (quoting Dyer v. Blair, 390 
F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1975)). 
 247 Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). 
 248 Id. at 997, 998. 
 249 Id. at 997 (emphasis added); see also Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 
206 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting that “it may be 
appropriate for courts to stay their hand in cases implicating delicate questions concerning the distri-
bution of political authority between coordinate branches until a dispute is ripe, intractable, and inca-
pable of resolution by the political process”). 
 250 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998. 
 251 Powell’s requirement of “actual confrontation” goes beyond the ordinary ripeness standard, 
which requires only that there be a live dispute between the parties. As Bradley and Morrison have 
noted, this “political ripeness” standard is “a requirement that is rarely if ever satisfied.” Curtis A. 
Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Essay, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Con-
straint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1110 (2013). 
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acted just a few months earlier.252 But the First Circuit declined to adjudicate 
the claim. Prudential ripeness principles militated against judicial intervention, 
the court explained, because “there [was] a day to day fluidity in the situation 
that [did] not amount to resolute conflict between the branches,” and because 
“[t]he purported conflict between the political branches may disappear.”253 
Thus, the issues presented by the plaintiffs’ claim were not yet fit for judicial 
resolution and could become so only if a clear and unambiguous conflict be-
tween Congress and the President were to emerge.254 
Nor have Justice Powell’s intuitions been confined to ripeness doctrine 
alone. In Kucinich v. Bush, for instance, the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia declined on political question grounds to adjudicate a dispute in 
which thirty-two members of Congress had challenged President George W. 
Bush’s unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.255 As 
the District Court explained, it would be inappropriate to “rule on the claim . . . 
that President Bush ignored the constitutional role of Congress in the treaty 
termination process, when Congress itself has not even asserted that it has been 
deprived of any constitutional right.”256 In other words, a judgment on the mer-
its would problematically “express[] [a] lack of the respect due to the coordi-
nate branches of government,” because it would involve “resolving an issue 
that neither the House nor the Senate has yet deemed worth asserting.”257 Simi-
larly, in United States ex rel. New v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia held that adjudicating a challenge to President Clinton’s 
deployment of troops to Macedonia would similarly evince the “lack of respect 
                                                                                                                           
 252 323 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 253 Id. at 137, 139. 
 254 Id. at 143 (“In th[e] zone of shared congressional and presidential responsibility, courts should 
intervene only when the dispute is clearly framed.”). To be sure, neither Goldwater itself nor Doe 
qualifies as an obviously “Category-Two” case. The latter case in particular seems more plausibly 
located within Category Three given that the plaintiffs there had expressly accused the President of 
violating an identified set of statutory limits. See id. at 139 (contending that Congress had authorized 
only those forms of military actions that were sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council and 
that, because the Security Council had not approved of the President’s actions, those actions ran afoul 
of a limit within the statute itself). Even so, it is not difficult to see how these cases’ ripeness-based 
prescriptions would end up applying a fortiori within the Category-Two context. If ripeness-based 
principles demand judicial forbearance where an apparent interbranch conflict has not yet become 
concrete, then they would surely do the same when the conflict itself has not yet even become appar-
ent. To the extent that courts demand an actual “clash” between the President and Congress as a pre-
condition to resolving a separation-of-powers dispute, Category-Two cases would seem especially 
vulnerable to a justiciability-based dismissal. 
 255 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2002). The district court also concluded that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing to bring the challenge, id., and that “under Justice Powell’s analysis [in Goldwater] 
the case is not ripe for judicial resolution,” id. at 17 n.12. 
 256 Id. at 17. 
 257 Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
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due coordinate branches of government,” given that “[t]here [was] . . . no con-
flict between the branches on this matter” and that “no contingent of Congress 
ha[d] ever . . . suggested that [the President] had to seek the approval of Con-
gress before proceeding.”258 In these and other cases, courts have thus cited to 
the presence of congressional inaction as a reason for circumventing, rather 
than engaging with, the “contemporary imponderables” of the twilight zone. 259 
Consider finally in this respect the First Circuit’s Vietnam-era decision in 
Massachusetts v. Laird.260 In that decision, as we have already seen,261 the 
court in one sense engaged with the twilight-zone directly, by quoting the rele-
vant language from Justice Jackson’s concurrence and by noting that, even 
though Congress had not formally ratified the Vietnam war, “the complaint 
reveal[ed] a long period of Congressional support” for the President’s military 
actions.262 But the court in Laird ultimately disposed of the case on political-
question grounds, noting that “[b]ecause the branches are not in opposition, 
there is no necessity of determining boundaries.”263 Thus, as the court saw it in 
Laird, the lack of conflict between Congress and the President served both to 
validate the President’s actions within the zone of twilight and to militate 
against the issuance of a full-scale decision about the zone of twilight. The 
same feature of the legislative backdrop—i.e., “the absence of any conflicting 
                                                                                                                           
 258 350 F. Supp. 2d 80, 97 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
 259 See, e.g., Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 
2017) (dismissing a Foreign Emoluments Clause-based challenge to Donald Trump’s investments and 
business practices on the ground that, as in Goldwater, “Plaintiffs’ suit implicates a similar concern 
regarding a conflict between two co-equal branches of government that has yet to mature” (citing 
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring))), vacated, 953 F.3d 178 (2d 
Cir. 2020), vacated and remanded as moot, Trump v. Crew, No. 20-330, 2021 WL 231541 (Jan. 25, 
2021); Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 301 (D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing as nonjusticiable a chal-
lenge to the legality of Operation Inherent Resolve, a military campaign against ISIL because “the 
Court in this case is not presented with a dispute between the two political branches regarding the 
challenged action”), vacated and dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018); see also Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 755 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 
1985) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint alleging unlawful deployment of cruise missiles, in part 
on the ground that the allegations asserted by congressional plaintiffs were not ripe for decision (citing 
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring))). It is perhaps also noteworthy in this respect 
that the Court more recently has cited to the presence of an active congressional-executive conflict as 
a reason not to dismiss a case as nonjusticiable. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 
189, 196 (2012) (“The existence of a statutory right . . . is certainly relevant to the Judiciary’s power 
to decide Zivotofsky’s claim. The federal courts are not being asked to supplant a foreign policy deci-
sion of the political branches with the courts’ own unmoored determination of what United States 
policy toward Jerusalem should be. Instead, Zivotofsky requests that the courts enforce a specific 
statutory right. . . . This is a familiar judicial exercise.”). 
 260 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971). 
 261 See supra notes 151–157 and accompanying text. 
 262 Laird, 451 F.2d at 34. 
 263 Id. 
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Congressional claim of authority”—that rendered the middle category applica-
ble was also a feature that rendered a merits judgment unnecessary.264 
Again, the point here is not to suggest that either Justice Powell in Gold-
water or any of the lower courts who followed his lead were consciously seek-
ing to avoid the murky doctrinal dictates of Justice Jackson’s middle category. 
Quite likely, some, if not all, of these decisions stemmed from genuine legal 
convictions that justiciability principles really did preclude adjudication on the 
merits. Even so, these cases at least illustrate a close conceptual connection 
between a defining feature of twilight-zone cases and an often-utilized basis 
for treating, either as a prudential matter or under Article III itself, disputes as 
nonjusticiable. And as long as that connection exists, justiciability-based doc-
trines will remain a readily available vehicle for getting rid of disputes that 
might otherwise implicate the zone of twilight. Thus, although we cannot say 
with certainty that judges are issuing justiciability-based holdings for the pur-
poses of twilight-zone avoidance, the easy availability of such a maneuver 
nonetheless supports, if only indirectly, our suspicion that this form of avoid-
ance sometimes occurs.265 
                                                                                                                           
 264 Id. To be sure, Laird itself is not a good example of “twilight zone avoidance.” If anything, the 
court made the opposite move, reaching out to offer an explicit, merits-based analysis—located within 
the zone of twilight—even where its ultimate disposition of the case rendered such an analysis unnec-
essary to the result. Contra id. at 33–34 (insisting that the merits and justiciability-based issues were 
inextricably interlinked). Even so, the case provides a nice example of how easily twilight-zone-type 
conclusions can closely overlap with conclusions regarding a case’s nonjusticiability. And for courts 
less inclined to reach the merits of twilight-zone cases, Laird’s parallel analyses offer a straightfor-
ward roadmap towards that goal. See, e.g., Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 137 (1st Cir. 2003) (suggesting 
that the district court had appropriately relied on Laird in concluding that the absence of a “resolute 
conflict between the branches . . . argue[d] against an uninformed judicial intervention” (citing Doe v. 
Bush, 240 F. Supp. 2d 95, 96 (D. Mass. 2002), aff’d, 323 F.3d 133)). 
 265 The idea that courts can “avoid” twilight-zone decisions by deeming the cases before them 
nonjusticiable presupposes that at least some twilight-zone cases are in fact appropriately addressed 
on the merits. But this is not the only possible interpretation of Justice Jackson’s middle category. 
Indeed, much to the contrary, Professor Laura Cisneros has recently suggested that because “[t]he 
vocabulary of category two is decidedly non-legal and instead describes a political reality devoid of 
legal rules and guidance,” the category is best conceptualized as “identif[ying] an area beyond legiti-
mate judicial decision-making (i.e., an area of non-justiciability).” Laura A. Cisneros, Youngstown 
Sheet to Boumediene: A Story of Judicial Ethos and the (Un)Fastidious Use of Language, 115 W. VA. 
L. REV. 577, 589 (2012); see id. at 592 (noting that, in twilight-zone cases, “Congress has neither 
acted nor indicated it has ceded the issue to the executive branch, leaving the Court, at least temporari-
ly, with no means to fashion a ruling”); id. at 594 (noting that “[t]he value of the zone of twilight . . . 
lies in its capacity to,” among other things, “remind the Court that some questions of presidential 
authority fall outside its jurisdiction, at least until Congress acts and fills the legal void with an appli-
cable statute”); see also Swaine, supra note 53, at 282 (highlighting the possibility that Justice Jack-
son’s opinion sets forth not so much “an approach to constitutional interpretation” in Category-Two 
cases, but rather “a theory of judicial abstention”). This is an intriguing possibility, for which Profes-
sor Cisneros offers a powerful defense. Cisneros, supra, at 594. But it is, as Cisneros herself acknowl-
edges, not consistent with the Court’s own decisions in Dames & Moore and Medellín, both of which 
operated from the presumption that twilight-zone cases are at least sometimes within courts’ power to 
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IV. THE TWILIGHT ZONE’S TWO DIMENSIONS 
We now turn from the descriptive to the prescriptive. Part II catalogued 
the hodgepodge of tools and techniques thus far deployed by judges when 
evaluating presidential action within the zone of twilight.266 And Part III pro-
vided some reason to suppose that the lack of a coherent methodology some-
times induces judges to avoid Category-Two analysis altogether.267 Combined 
together, those two Parts suggest that further specification of what Justice Jack-
son’s middle category entails would help both to regularize opinions that engage 
with the zone of twilight and reduce the number of opinions that avoid it. 
In this Part, we propose a method of twilight-zone analysis that would 
help to further these goals. More specifically, our aim is to prescribe a means 
of working through Category-Two cases that, although still flexible and con-
text-sensitive, manages to channel and streamline the relevant constitutional 
considerations in a consistent and coherent way. We harbor no illusions that 
our proposed specification would make hard cases easy to decide, nor for that 
matter do we think that that ought to be the ultimate goal. Too much doctrinal 
simplicity, after all, would end up compromising the “functionalist” ambitions 
of the framework itself.268 Nevertheless, we do think that a more structured 
and streamlined approached to twilight-zone analysis would help to demystify 
the adjudication of Category-Two questions, while also ensuring greater judi-
cial attention to, and transparency about, the key constitutional variables that 
ought to drive the resolution of such questions. 
We begin developing our approach by revisiting the various forms of twi-
light-zone engagement we considered in Part II. With one important excep-
tion,269 that body of opinions homed in on at least one of two different features 
                                                                                                                           
decide. See Cisneros, supra, at 595 (noting that, in both cases, “the Court transformed Jackson’s zone 
of twilight into an area of justiciability by infusing it with legal rules and standards in a way that mis-
characterizes the text of Jackson’s opinion”). Thus, as a matter of modern Supreme Court doctrine, 
one cannot fall back—at least categorically—on the suggestion that all twilight-zone cases are nonjus-
ticiable as a definitional matter. As plausible as that reading of Justice Jackson’s concurrence might 
be, it is a reading that the Court itself has explicitly rejected. 
 266 See supra Part II. 
 267 See supra Part III. 
 268 See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. COM-
MENT. 87, 89 (2002) (“Many who study the balance of congressional and presidential power, especial-
ly in the area of foreign affairs, view Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown as providing a 
sensible framework for resolving the conflicting claims of the two branches and decry this frame-
work’s alleged erosion in subsequent case law.” (footnote omitted)). 
 269 We are referring here to the two opinions that seemed to treat Category-Two action as consti-
tutionally indistinguishable from Category-One action. These opinions treat the absence of congres-
sional disapproval as per se sufficient grounds for extending the same presumption of validity to the 
challenged action that would otherwise be triggered by a showing of formal statutory approval. See 
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of the action under review. First, several of the opinions we considered either 
sought to infer acquiescence from congressional silence,270 or to identify a 
“general tenor” of congressional approval or disapproval from the relevant leg-
islative materials.271 An important shared feature of these opinions, therefore, 
was the way they linked the validity of twilight-zone action to the variable of 
congressional receptiveness, treating signals of congressional acquies-
cence/acceptance (or non-acquiescence/non-acceptance) as a reason to uphold 
(or not uphold) the action under review. This is, at first glance, a counterintui-
tive maneuver. What triggers the Category-Two analysis, after all, is an “ab-
sence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority,”272 and one would 
thus expect Congress’s own attitudes to play a limited, if not non-existent, role 
once a determination of congressional silence has been made. Nevertheless, 
these twilight-zone opinions still found a way to make Congress matter, seiz-
ing on “softer” indicia of congressional approval or disapproval as bearing on 
their bottom-line constitutional results. 
The second variable of relevance to at least some of the opinions we con-
sidered was the relationship between the challenged executive action and the 
President’s constitutional role. More specifically, and as we saw in Part II, a 
few twilight-zone opinions treated the absence of formal congressional guid-
ance as an invitation to consider more abstractly the Article II appropriateness 
of the action under review. Then-Judge Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion in Al-
Bihani v. Obama, for instance, placed weight on the fact that the President was 
acting “extraterritorially against non-U.S. citizens in self-defense of the Na-
tion”—a “realm” within which “the President possesses broad authority under 
Article II.”273 Similarly, Judge Baker’s dissenting opinion in United States v. 
Jones drew a similar connection between the unilateral presidential action he 
would have deemed controlling and the President’s Article II authority as 
Commander in Chief.274 These opinions thus gestured toward the intuition that, 
when Congress is silent, the President should have more constitutional leeway 
to do those things that more closely relate to the institutional prerogatives of 
the presidency. And, having demonstrated that the relevant Category-Two ac-
tions fell on the high end of the “Article II appropriateness” spectrum, both 
                                                                                                                           
supra Part II.A. For reasons we have already identified, we do not believe that this type of analysis is 
consistent with the overall structure of the Justice Jackson framework. 
 270 See supra Part II.B. 
 271 See supra Part II.C. 
 272 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 273 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
 274 United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465, 477 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (Baker, J., dissenting). 
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opinions proceeded to treat this conclusion as a powerful reason for upholding 
the actions against constitutional attack. 
In our view, each of these two variables—the congressional receptiveness 
variable and the Article II appropriateness variable—capture important and 
relevant considerations that ought to carry weight within the zone of twilight. 
An evaluation of “congressional receptiveness” rightly rejects the proposition 
that a congressional failure to place the President’s action within Category One 
or Three necessarily implies total congressional apathy or ambivalence about 
that action’s appropriateness. It can and should be possible for Congress to 
communicate some sort of view concerning what the President has done with-
out ever generating legislation that formally authorizes or prohibits the action 
in question. And the “Article II appropriateness” variable jibes with the 
straightforward idea that the President should generally have more leeway to 
do those things that comport with the President’s own institutional role. But, 
whereas many of the Category-Two opinions that we considered seemed to 
emphasize one of these variables over the other, we think that the best ap-
proach to twilight-zone analysis is one that brings both variables together, 
predicating the ultimate constitutional result on the interplay between Con-
gress’s own input and Article II’s own priorities. 
We call this a two-dimensional approach to twilight-zone analysis.275 Us-
ing this approach, a court confronting twilight-zone action would first consider 
the extent to which Congress has manifested informal signals of receptiveness 
or non-receptiveness toward that action’s validity. For example, a high level of 
congressional receptiveness might be inferred by a prolonged period of con-
gressional inactivity in response to a series of visibly high-profile presidential 
                                                                                                                           
 275 The approach we offer here bears some similarity to Roy Brownell’s attempt to reconcile the 
Youngstown concurrence with the Court’s earlier suggestion, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp., that the President’s powers in international relations were “plenary and exclusive.” See 
Roy E. Brownell II, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube v. Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J.L. & POL. 1, 20 (2000) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936)). Professor 
Brownell’s proposed reconciliation involves a bifurcation of each of Justice Jackson’s three categories 
to form six operative categories of executive branch action, that, proceeding from the least to most 
constitutionally problematic, are: (i) “national security” action authorized by Congress; (ii) “domestic” 
actions authorized by Congress; (iii) “national security” actions not authorized by Congress; (iv) “do-
mestic” actions not authorized by Congress; (v) “national security” actions prohibited by Congress; 
and (vi) “domestic” actions prohibited by Congress. See id. at 64. Insofar as one regards Brownell’s 
so-called “national security” actions as scoring higher on the “Article II appropriateness” spectrum, 
we think our model is generally compatible with Brownell’s model. But ours, we think, carries the 
important advantage of eschewing a binary (and often, rather indeterminate and manipulable) distinc-
tion between “domestic” actions and “national security” actions in favor of a more holistic assessment 
of the relationship between a presidential action and the President’s own Article II responsibilities. 
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acts,276 or perhaps by a “holistic” reading of several indirectly legislative stat-
utes that together highlight a posture of congressional deference toward the 
executive. Conversely, a low level of congressional receptiveness might be 
most strongly supported by the passage of a bill through both Houses of Con-
gress that ultimately failed to receive the President’s signature, or, less robust-
ly, by the passage of a bill by one House of Congress coupled with a failure by 
the other House to formally weigh in. A low level of congressional receptive-
ness could even be inferred from various forms of “soft law” that unofficially 
communicate Congress’s concerns about what the President has done.277 Genu-
ine congressional apathy or ambivalence, meanwhile, might be inferred from 
the passage of conflicting bills by each house, the complete absence of statutes 
with any bearing on the President’s underlying action, or a short-term period of 
silence in the face of a relatively unprecedented presidential act. 
But whatever the nature of the court’s receptiveness finding, the inquiry 
would not yet be over. Rather, the court would then proceed to evaluate the 
challenged action in relation to the President’s own constitutional role. Thus, a 
judge might distinguish between the presidential regulation of “domestic af-
fairs,” which would register a lower level of Article II appropriateness, and the 
President’s regulation of “foreign affairs,” which would generally register a 
higher level of Article II appropriateness. Similarly, the Court might treat pur-
portedly temporary presidential action in the face of a pressing emergency as 
enjoying a higher degree of Article II appropriateness than purportedly perma-
nent presidential action undertaken in the absence of an emergency. And so 
forth.278 Obviously, the better the case for concluding that the President is tack-
                                                                                                                           
 276 In advocating for this proposal, we do not mean to suggest that courts’ own past attempts to 
equate congressional silence with “congressional acquiescence” have been on the mark, and we think 
there is much to be said against an approach that automatically equates congressional inaction in re-
sponse to executive action as a sign that Congress has no objections to what the President is doing. 
See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 5, at 448 (contending that “[t]he Madisonian model’s de-
scriptive shortcomings” require “much greater care and precision in making and evaluating . . . 
claims” about congressional acquiescence); Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 668, 740 (2016) (noting that, although “[a]cquiescence is subject to deep and unappre-
ciated critiques . . . . [m]any of them can be overcome if we recognize and respond to them when 
assessing past practice”). 
 277 See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 603 (2008) (noting that “[t]he soft statute should be the preferred mechanism 
for articulating congressional views” within the zone of twilight).  
 278 Indeed, one of the virtues of focusing attention on a scalar variable of Article II appropriate-
ness, rather than a binary question of whether “Article II does or does not allow” the President’s ac-
tion, is that it allows us to recognize that different types of presidential action bear different types of 
relationships to what Congress has done. Thus, for instance, Professor Abner Greene has distin-
guished among five different types of presidential powers: (1) powers “granted to the President’s sole 
discretion by Article II”; (2) power that is presumptively available to the President, “subject to either 
an ex ante or ex post act of Congress forbidding such action”; (3) power that “is regulable through 
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ling issues within the President’s Article II domain (as opposed to undertaking 
an initiative more closely related with one of the other two branches), the 
stronger the finding of “Article II appropriateness” should be. 
Finally, having evaluated the challenged action along both of the identi-
fied analyses, a court employing our approach would attempt to reconcile the 
results. Where both congressional receptiveness and Article II appropriateness 
are high, the twilight-zone analysis ought to come out in the President’s favor. 
Likewise, where both variables are low, the analysis ought to come out the 
other way. And where the variables point in different directions, the reviewing 
court has no choice but to balance the competing findings against one another. 
In so doing, the court must grapple with difficult questions as to whether the 
Article II appropriateness of a presidential act is sufficiently high to overcome 
the identified signals of congressional non-receptiveness, or whether the con-
gressional receptiveness is sufficiently high to overcome a relatively weak 
showing of Article II appropriateness. 
At this point, of course, the utility of additional abstract guidance starts to 
run out. The reviewing court, as is often the case, will face a hard judgment 
call as to which of two conflicting considerations ought to prevail. But even 
under those circumstances, we think our approach has the virtue of clarifying 
the framing of the underlying analysis without oversimplifying it. Consequent-
ly, even in tough, judgment-call-type cases, the two-dimensional approach has 
the additional virtue of forcing the court to acknowledge and engage with the 
conflicting constitutional signals in a fully transparent way. 
                                                                                                                           
congressional action short of an Article I, Section 7 law”; (4) power that “the President may wield, but 
only after Congress has delegated [it] through law”; and (5) power that “isn’t available at all.” Abner 
S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 191–
93 (1994). These various subcategories of presidential action (and perhaps further subcategories as 
well) can be usefully arrayed along the “Article II appropriateness” axis, moving in descending order 
from “very high” all the way down to “very low.” 
794 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:741 
 
Figure 1: “Two-Dimensional” Twilight-Zone Analysis in Relation to the  
Other Two Youngstown Categories279 
A further benefit of our approach, we think, is that it creates conceptual 
unity across all three categories of Justice Jackson’s framework. As illustrated 
by Figure 1, considerations of congressional receptiveness already play an im-
portant role in guiding the threshold determination of which of the frame-
work’s categories applies. And considerations of Article II appropriateness re-
main relevant even where Categories One and Three are at issue. Thus, for ex-
ample, even a presumptively valid Category-One action might violate the sepa-
ration-of-powers insofar as Congress purports to authorize executive action 
that Article I flatly forbids.280 And even presumptively invalid Category-Three 
actions might withstand a separation-of-powers attack insofar as the action 
relates so closely to core Article II duties as to belong exclusively to the Presi-
dent.281 
                                                                                   
279 Because not all platforms reproduce graphics, the figure is also available at https://www.bc.
edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/62-3/coenen_sullivan_graphic.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/679U-E463]. 
 280 This is, for instance, the basic idea underlying the nondelegation doctrine, which prohibits 
Congress from conferring on the President (and other executive branch officials) a “lawmaking” au-
thority that goes beyond the Article II power to “execute the law.” See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537–38 (1935) (“Congress cannot delegate legislative power to 
the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or 
advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade or industry.”). 
 281 Recall, for instance, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, in which the Court upheld a form of 
Category-Three executive action on the theory that Article II conferred on the President the exclusive 
power to “recognize” foreign governments. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2095 (2015) (“If Congress may not pass 
a law, speaking in its own voice, that effects formal recognition, then it follows that it may not force 
the President himself to contradict his earlier statement. That congressional command would not only 
prevent the Nation from speaking with one voice but also prevent the Executive itself from doing so in 
conducting foreign relations.”). 
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Put somewhat differently, Categories One and Three both attach rule-like 
presumptions to presidential actions that rank either especially high or low on 
the “congressional receptiveness” scale, treating Category-One action as pre-
sumptively valid unless its Article II appropriateness falls below a preset floor, 
and treating Category Three as presumptively invalid unless its Article II ap-
propriateness exceeds a preset ceiling. Our two-dimensional approach to twi-
light-zone analysis, meanwhile, calls for a more calibrated weighing of these 
two variables under circumstances in which the congressional receptiveness 
variable fails to cut decisively in either direction.282 
Perhaps the most significant constitutional obstacle to implementing our 
prescribed approach is the Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha.283 There, in dis-
allowing the use of a “one-House” veto of executive branch action, the Court 
made clear that Congress lacked the power to make law outside of the “single, 
finely wrought and exhaustively considered[] procedure” set forth by Article I, 
Section 7.284 Our approach is at least arguably inconsistent with Chadha inso-
far as it continues to accord significance to the variable of congressional recep-
tiveness under circumstances in which Congress has not formally (i.e., legisla-
tively) spoken. To the extent receptiveness (or non-receptiveness) manifests 
itself within the middle category, it will do so by means of congressional ac-
tions that do not satisfy Article I’s bicameralism and presentment requirements, 
such as prohibitory legislation that met with a presidential veto, authorizing 
legislation that cleared the House but was filibustered in the Senate, or simply 
a form of total congressional inaction that, under the totality of the circum-
stances, might be construed to signal unofficial acquiescence. Under our pre-
scribed approach, all of these indicia would carry potentially decisive constitu-
tional weight, particularly with respect to presidential actions whose “Article II 
appropriateness” falls toward the lower end of the spectrum. And that fact, un-
der Chadha, presents a potential problem, as it would essentially empower 
                                                                                                                           
 282 Our model is also consistent with the Supreme Court’s largely ignored instruction in Dames & 
Moore that executive action will not fall “neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but rather at some point 
along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibi-
tion.” Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981). Although the Dames & Moore Court 
describes “congressional will” in a manner akin to our articulation of “congressional receptiveness,” it 
fails to identify that presidential power operates along a similarly dynamic range. A recognition of 
calibration in considering “Article II appropriateness” is similarly implicit in the Court’s holding 
statement in Loving v. United States that delegations “call[ing] for the exercise of judgment or discre-
tion that lies beyond the traditional authority of the President” are more likely to violate the separation 
of powers. 517 U.S. 748, 772 (1996). 
 283 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 284 Id. at 951, 952. 
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Congress to enable or disable presidential action through means that circum-
vent the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I.285 
But although it is true that certain types of Chadha-noncompliant activi-
ties could sometimes “make a difference” within our prescribed framework, 
we think it would do so only in an evidentiary sense. There is an important 
distinction between the conclusion that Congress has passed a law that author-
izes or prohibits presidential action (thus implicating either Category One or 
Category Three) and the conclusion that, in the absence of operative law that 
points one way or the other, Congress has suggested a particular viewpoint on 
what the President has pursued (thus carrying relevance within Category Two). 
We can all agree that Chadha would, for instance, preclude the Court from 
treating the attempted but unsuccessful repeal of a statute authorizing the Pres-
ident to undertake Action X as grounds for removing Action X from Category 
One. (Any other conclusion, after all, would give official, law-like status to a 
Chadha-noncompliant action and thus run afoul of Article I’s bicameralism 
and presentment requirements.) But that is different from simply concluding, 
in the absence of formal statutory guidance in either direction, that Congress as 
an institution likely favors or opposes what the President is doing and then tak-
ing that fact into account when deciding to permit an action of borderline con-
stitutional validity. “In this scenario,” as Jake Gersen and Eric Posner have put 
it, “legislative sentiments, expressed in nonbinding mechanisms, are taken as 
inputs in the decision-making processes of other institutions—the courts—that 
themselves generate binding rules.”286 
CONCLUSION 
The zone of twilight is “elusive” both in the sense that its doctrinal import 
remains frustratingly difficult to pin down and that its demarcated doctrinal 
territory is often and easily evaded. Both forms of elusiveness, moreover, are 
mutually reinforcing: the more often courts avoid the zone of twilight, the less 
light they shed on its still-uncertain contours; and the less light they shed, the 
more reason courts have to avoid it. That, at least, is what the lower courts’ 
own sporadic work with the middle category suggests. 
At the same time, the current, unsatisfactory state of twilight-zone juris-
prudence need not remain its permanent state. Our proposed re-conception of 
                                                                                                                           
 285 Cf. Alan B. Morrison, The Sounds of Silence: The Irrelevance of Congressional Inaction in 
Separation of Powers Litigation, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1211, 1219 (2013) (highlighting Chadha as 
a “constitutional barrier to relying on silence or inaction” within the Youngstown context); Swaine, 
supra note 53, at 288 (“Attaching legal consequence to nonstatutory action, or even inaction, is in 
tension with constitutional principles requiring that Congress attend to legislative formalities.”). 
 286 Gersen & Posner, supra note 277, at 604. 
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the middle category offers a potential way out of the existing doctrinal morass. 
At its best, the twilight zone enables courts to evaluate congressional recep-
tiveness relative to Article II appropriateness—thus engaging contextually with 
the two doctrinal variables that carry salience across the entirety of Justice 
Jackson’s framework. Our hope is that, having embraced that understanding, 
courts will gain enough comfort and familiarity with twilight-zone analysis to 
break the cycle of avoidance and amorphousness that currently besets the doc-
trine. And that in turn should yield enhanced consistency, coherence, and 
transparency across the difficult and highly consequential disputes over execu-
tive power that show no sign of abating. That is not to say, of course, that an 
openly two-dimensional approach to Category-Two cases will render previous-
ly difficult questions of presidential power easy to solve. But, in helping to 
highlight and streamline the relevant constitutional considerations at play, the 
approach promises to make the zone of twilight a little less dim. 
 
 
  
 
